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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
A basic feature of the law of insolvency is that all creditors must be treated equitably. Of 
course, there are different classes of creditors; thus secure creditors will, as the name 
suggests, be entitled to a greater share of the insolvent estate than ordinary creditors. 
However, this does not detract from the basic principle: that all creditors share in one unified 
estate according to a set and predictable order. 
Admiralty law though, pays little regard to the basic principle and shipping creditors 
are armed with procedures and remedies unknown to all other creditors, including when a 
debtor goes insolvent. Indeed, the difference between an ordinary commercial creditor and a 
shipping creditor are so marked that shipping creditors have at their disposal a specialised 
civil jurisdiction to recover their debts.  
The essential issue with which this dissertation is concerned is the competition 
between these two different groups of creditors and how South African law mediates their 
interests when a shipowner goes insolvent. Whilst seemingly a straightforward matter of 
competition between creditors, it is anything but when shipping law becomes involved. This 
is because in South Africa, as in other commonwealth countries that have inherited the 
English common law tradition, admiralty jurisdiction operates as its own separate civil 
jurisdiction, applying its own law and with specialised remedies. 
Because of this strong link to English law,1 no evaluation of admiralty law in South 
Africa can begin without first considering the history of admiralty law in England. So it is to 
a brief consideration of English legal history that we must first turn to. 
Throughout its long history in England, Admiralty law has developed a number of 
special remedies and rights for maritime claimants. Due to the history of the Admiralty Court, 
especially its application, traditionally, of civilian law, many of the procedures were 
unknown at common law. This led to a court exercising a distinct jurisdiction and applying a 
different law, existing alongside the ordinary common law courts of the time. The many 
difficulties entailed by separate courts exercising concurrent jurisdictions in England are well 
                                                 
1 Indeed, s 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction and Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (‘AJRA’), obliges a South African 
court, when faced with most maritime matters, to apply English law as at 1983. See Transol Bunker v MV 
Andrico Unity and Others 1989 (4) SA 325 (A) at 334H-336C. 
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documented.2 The problem was thought to be solved by the fusion of the separate courts such 
as Chancery, King’s Bench, Common Bench, High Court of Admiralty, and Exchequer into 
the Supreme Court of Judicature.3 And whilst the fusion of common law with equity might 
have been a success, the same cannot wholly be said of common law and admiralty law. 
This ill-fitting merger becomes especially obvious when one considers the overlap 
between admiralty law and the law governing insolvency in both legal systems. The reason 
for this is simple. One of the chief virtues of admiralty law is the action in rem. This remedy 
enables a maritime claimant4 to arrest select maritime property5 (usually a ship) against, or in 
respect of which, a maritime claim has arisen for the purpose of founding jurisdiction and of 
providing pre-judgment security. These two consequences are unusual from a common law 
point of view.6  
Jurisdiction is normally exercised for causes of action arising within the territory of 
the court hearing the case, and for parties (especially the defendant) who are resident in the 
                                                 
2 See CR Lovell English Constitutional and Legal History 514-515, FW Maitland The Constitutional History of 
England 470-471 and M Jonsson ‘The nature of the action in rem’ (2001) 75 ALJ 105 at 114-116.  
3 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c. 66). 
4 That is to say, a person claiming under a defined list of claims, usually termed maritime claims, in s 20(2) and 
(3) of the now Senior Courts Act, 1981 (UK), formerly called the Supreme Court Act until the Constitutional 
Reform Act, 2005 (UK), s 59, which commenced on 26 June 2009 by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
(Commencement No. 11) Order 2009. This list of selected claims is based on the list of maritime claims that 
appeared in the English Administration of Justice Act, 1956 (4 & 5 Eliz 2 c 46). Both Acts undoubtedly based 
their lists of maritime claims on the list of claims in the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules relating to the Arrest of Sea-going Ships 1952 (the ‘Arrest Convention’). One of the great advantages of 
proceeding in admiralty, especially in relation to the location of the defendant and of the cause of action, is that 
the jurisdictional rules are much less exacting than normal parochial proceedings. Thus, by virtue of s 20(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Senior Courts Act: ‘[the admiralty division has jurisdiction to determine the claims in s 20(2) and 
(3)], wherever the residence or domicile of their owners may be, and in relation to all claims, wherever arising’ 
(my emphasis). 
The same is true in South Africa where the Admiralty Jurisdiction and Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (hereafter 
‘AJRA’) has a similar list of claims in s 1 as s 20(2) and (3) of the Senior Courts Act, as well as sharing the 
broad jurisdiction in s 2(1) that ‘… [any division of the High Court] shall have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any maritime claim irrespective of  the place where it arose, or the place of registration of the ship 
concerned, or the residence, domicile or nationality of the owner’ (my emphasis). 
5 Section 3(5)(a) to (f) of the AJRA. 
6 Cf attachment to found jurisdiction in South African law for incolae and the saisie conservatoire well known 
to civil law countries. 
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court’s territory.7 Admiralty law disregards this and allows a peregrini plaintiff to have a 
claim settled in South Africa (or England), against a peregrini defendant, for a cause of 
action arising abroad. The only grounds of jurisdiction needed in admiralty broadly are that 
the claim be a ‘maritime claim’ as defined in s 1 of the AJRA and that there be an arrest or 
attachment, or a deemed arrest/attachment.8 An arrest or attachment is needed of course to 
render any judgment effective by having an asset within the court’s jurisdiction against which 
proceeds any judgment may be enforced.9 The novelty of admiralty is that an arrest 
invariably occurs well before judgment. This is however not unknown in South Africa where, 
under certain circumstances, a claimant may attach (any) property belonging to a peregrinus 
defendant pre-judgment.10  
The arrest of a ship in rem in a dispute between peregrini for a cause of action arising 
abroad would make for an interesting discussion on the extended jurisdiction exercised by the 
admiralty court, but it is not the topic for discussion here. Of much greater interest for the 
purposes of this dissertation is the ability of a court sitting in admiralty to order the pre-
judgment arrest or attachment of a ship and the consequences this may have for both 
maritime and parochial creditors of the shipowner. 
Insolvency law is triggered by a debtor being unable to settle all his debts as his 
liabilities exceed his assets. An insolvency order results in a concursus creditorum, the estate 
being fixed so that no further liabilities may be incurred, and in time, an orderly settling of 
the insolvent estate so that creditors may share in the estate according to a pre-determined 
ranking. Dispositions of company assets just prior to the insolvency order may also be 
recovered by the liquidator to be shared by all of the insolvent’s creditors. In the oft-quoted 
words of Innes JA (as he then was):  
 
                                                 
7 See note 4 supra. 
8 Technically it would be possible to have a South African court exercising admiralty jurisdiction in personam 
without any attachment. This would be the case if the defendant were a South African incola. In such a case, 
attachment is impermissible according to s 28 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 (now s 28 of the Superior 
Courts Act 10 of 2013).  The defendant in an action in personam may also submit to the court’s jurisdiction and 
so preclude any subsequent attachment, see Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA) paras 25-30 and Tsung v 
Industrial Development Corporation of SA Ltd 2006 (4) SA 177 (SCA). 
9 Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) at 310H. 
10 See the discussion on the history of attachments ad fundandam jurisdictionem (interestingly also taken over 
by Scottish Law) in Roman-Dutch and South African law in Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Ltd v Nelspruit 
Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) at 305E-308A. 
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The [liquidation] order crystallises the insolvent's position; the hand of the law is laid upon 
the estate, and at once the rights of the general body of creditors have to be taken into 
consideration. No transaction can thereafter be entered into with regard to estate matters 
by a single creditor to the prejudice of the general body. The claim of each creditor must 
be dealt with as it existed at the issue of the order.11 
 
In such a scenario, the capacity for admiralty and insolvency law to clash becomes 
obvious. The following passage sums up the essential problem admirably well: 
 
The law of corporate liquidation and bankruptcy seems to have developed with little 
regard to the Admiralty proceeding in rem. Certainly it is difficult to fit the Admiralty 
proceedings into the legislative language of the relevant statutes which regulate the 
winding up of companies and bankruptcy. Yet the need for the latter to accommodate the 
action in rem and the potential conflict between the two processes is plain. A res may 
concurrently be the subject of an arrest in the Admiralty Court and an asset capable of 
liquidation in a company winding up or personal bankruptcy. In such a circumstance it is 
important for a maritime claimant to be able to ascertain whether it is the jurisdiction of 
the Admiralty Court or some other court which prevails and which mode of legal process 
is available for the satisfaction of the claim.12 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the circumstances in South Africa under 
which admiralty law, and so by extension maritime claimants, may take priority over the 
liquidator and the creditors of the estate under normal, parochial law. In order to properly 
evaluate the South African solution, comparisons with the way in which English law has 
addressed this issue will be made. As we shall see, English case law has attempted to fit and 
explain admiralty procedures within insolvency legislation with some quite startling and 
disorderly results. Along the way, they have had to broaden a discretion given to them by 
statute in order to accommodate admiralty’s distinct procedures (which discretion they would 
not usually have used to help a normal creditor under common law proceedings). This 
evinces a marked shipping bias allowing maritime claimants to proceed with their claim 
where, under similar circumstances, a non-maritime creditor would be barred from doing so. 
South African law has solved the problem, to some extent, by provisions which I shall argue 
clearly displace parochial jurisdiction in favour of admiralty jurisdiction and vice versa 
depending on the circumstances. This is a much simpler way of approaching this sometimes 
intractable problem and English law would do well to look at the South African example in 
seeking a more clear-cut and coherent approach. In essence, South African law treats this as a 
problem of concurrent jurisdiction and its solution is to, depending on the circumstances, 
                                                 
11 Walker v Syfrets 1911 AD 141 at 166. 
12 D R Thomas Maritime Liens (1980) 65.   
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have one jurisdiction trump the other. English law on the other hand seeks to straightjacket 
admiralty procedures into the language of their insolvency legislation; it is especially 
concerned with whether a maritime claimant can be said to be a ‘secured creditor’. The latter 
view, on grounds of principle and practicalities, somewhat misses the point. 
Chapter two will explore in detail the provisions relating to the procedures and rights 
available to a maritime creditor and, in chapter three, how these play out when the law 
relating to corporate winding-up (both on the grounds of inability to pay debts and voluntary 
winding-up) becomes involved. The law relating personal insolvency (termed ‘sequestration’ 
in South Africa and ‘bankruptcy’ in England’) and the law of business rescue are 
unfortunately outside the scope of this paper although anyone interested in these two areas 
and how they interact with admiralty law will undoubtedly draw much from this paper as the 
main provisions (automatic stays, void procedures, voidable dispositions, commencement of 
insolvency/business rescue) are very similar to the provisions analysed in this dissertation. 
Also outside the scope of this dissertation is the tricky issue of the intersection between cross-
border insolvency and shipping law.13  
Chapter four surveys the English solution to this issue and concludes that English law 
may benefit by looking at the problem, as s 10 of AJRA does, as one of concurrent 
jurisdiction – a view which, up until now, has been tersely rejected.14 Chapter five discusses 
South Africa’s innovative s 10 of AJRA, whilst chapter six discusses two very interesting 
arguments that have come up in English cases, though have never been the subject of serious 
consideration by the courts. 
This dissertation is pre-eminently concerned with South African law. However, 
because South African admiralty law owes its genesis and much of its present day content to 
                                                 
13 For an overview of the issues in this area see Melissa KS Alwang ‘Steering the most appropriate course 
between admiralty and insolvency’ (1995-1996) 64 Fordham LR 2613 and Sarah Derrington ‘Introduction to 
cross-border maritime insolvency’ CMI Yearbook 2011-2012 at 368 accessible at: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Cross%20Border/Paper%20of%20Sarah%20Derrington.pdf (accessed 
9 September 2014). See also the recent case of Overseas Shipholding Group Inc (KZD) unreported case no 
12827/12 (7 December 2012) where the court recognised the US chapter 11 bankruptcy order as well as the 
automatic stay provision in the US’s Bankruptcy Code (s 362) and ordered the stay to apply throughout South 
Africa.  
14 In Re Aro Co. Ltd [1980] Ch. 196 at 209B-C.  
9 
 
English admiralty law15 and because of the differences which exist between the two systems 
when it comes to the interface between admiralty and insolvency law, English law will be 
heavily referred to and compared. 
At this point, it would be useful to briefly explain some key concepts, emphasise 
important distinctions, and set out some of the more important legislative provisions 
governing the issues.  
In admiralty in South Africa16 (as in England), an action in rem may be instituted by 
the arrest of only certain property against, or in respect of which, the claim lies.17 For ease of 
reference only a ship shall be referred to in this thesis as this is frequently the property 
against or in respect of which a maritime claim will lie. This reference to a ship though 
should be taken to include the other five types of maritime property which AJRA allows to be 
arrested in rem.18 To arrest in rem the claimant must have either a maritime lien,19 or the 
owner of the ship to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an action in personam in 
respect of the cause of action concerned.20 This is a most important distinction as a maritime 
lien exists from the time the events giving rise to the claim occur.21 Therefore a maritime lien 
exists and has substantive effect before it is enforced via an arrest in rem. A statutory right of 
action in rem (commonly, though perhaps somewhat imprecisely termed a statutory lien) on 
the other hand, becomes active when the writ is issued. Finally, there is also the possibility of 
proceeding in personam by attaching any of the property of the defendant in South Africa.22 
                                                 
15 By virtue of s 6 of AJRA which obliges a South African court exercising admiralty jurisdiction to apply 
English admiralty law for matters falling within SA courts’ pre-existing jurisdiction (ie the jurisdiction it 
exercised before the commencement of AJRA in 1983). 
16 Section 3(5) of AJRA. 
17 A remnant of the ‘guilty ship’ concept. Bar certain exceptions which are not important for present purposes, it 
is only the ship which did the damage or incurred the debt which may be arrested. This personification of the 
ship as the party against which a claim lies informs much of shipping law and is a helpful tool to understand 
parts of admiralty law. However, the ship personification concept should not be taken too far. It helps to explain 
some, though by no means all, of the consequences of admiralty law. 
18 Section 3(5) of AJRA. 
19 Section 3(4)(a) of AJRA. 
20 Section 3(4)(b) of AJRA. 
21 The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo 267 (PC) at 284-286. 
22 This is the usual civil mode of proceeding in South Africa. Of course, if the defendant is an incola of the 
Republic, attachment is impermissible (see s 28 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959), although interestingly 
arrest in rem is permissible. If the defendant is not an incola of the Republic however, an attachment is 
necessary (to render effective any judgment of the SA court). As the claim would be a maritime claim under s 1 
10 
 
Frequently, this will be a ship passing through SA waters. So again, a reference in this thesis 
to attaching a ship should be taken to include other property – ‘ship’ is used as a convenient 
shorthand. And unlike arrest, attachment can be directed against any of the owner’s property 
(and not just those listed in s 3(5)(a) to (e)) and this property need not be ‘against, or in 
respect of which the claim lies.’  
Timing is an essential underlying theme that runs throughout this paper. Therefore 
though these distinctions may seem slight, each stage of the procedure has different 
consequences for claimants, defendants and liquidators.  
To summarise the position thus far; the essential problem is the overlap between 
admiralty and insolvency law. This is because admiralty creditors are armed with procedures 
unknown at common law and because insolvency legislation and nomenclature has developed 
with little or no regard to these special admiralty procedures. In admiralty, a ship arrested 
would, unless security is forthcoming, be sold and form a fund to satisfy the claims of 
maritime creditors who can prove their (maritime) claims against the fund.23 The object of a 
maritime claim (usually a ship) may thus fall into the admiralty estate (so called as it satisfies 
only maritime claims to the exclusion of ordinary civil claims) or into the insolvent estate. 
The main issue therefore is how the laws of England and South Africa have responded to this 
rather obvious conflict.  
                                                                                                                                                        
of AJRA, the cause of action need not have arisen in SA for a SA court to exercise jurisdiction. In this respect 
then, admiralty jurisdiction extends well beyond that exercisable by a parochial court.  
23 Section 11 of AJRA contains a statutory scheme of distribution when prioritising claims against the fund 
formed from the sale of the ship. In English law, there is no prescribed statutory ranking. The ranking of claims 
is instead determined by the court’s equitable discretion, largely on the basis of precedent. See Meeson 
Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice 4 ed (2011) at 219 and Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in 
South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 281. 
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CHAPTER 2: KEY CONCEPTS IN ADMIRATLY 
 
I. The action in rem, the action in personam, and maritime liens 
 
In chapter one, it was said that certain key concepts must be kept in mind. In admiralty, the 
most important distinction is that between the dual ways of pursuing a maritime claim: by an 
action in rem, or by an action in personam.24 These are not two separate causes of action but 
simply alternate methods of enforcing a maritime claim.25 Both require either an arrest (actual 
or deemed) of specific maritime property against or in respect of which the claim arose, or an 
attachment of any of the defendant’s property within the court’s jurisdiction. Of course, arrest 
is limited to six types of property,26 and the property must be the ‘guilty property’.27 
Practically speaking though, whether property is attached or arrested, the result (in terms of 
what property is detained by the sheriff) is likely to be the same; if a creditor wanted to attach 
rather than arrest, the only property within the court’s jurisdiction is likely to be exactly the 
same sort of property that would have been arrested in rem ie maritime property. 
Superficially then, arrest and attachment seem quite similar especially as the property to be 
arrested or attached is almost invariably of the same type. The superficial similarities remain 
when one considers that both an action in rem and one in personam require that the property 
to be arrested or attached as the case may be, is owned by the defendant, ie there must be 
personal liability on the claim by the defendant (although an action in rem may also be 
instituted not on the basis of the defendant’s underlying liability, but on the basis of a 
maritime lien, see infra). 
 But of course, the procedure for an arrest is quite different from that of an 
attachment; the former, for example, is a much quicker process and does not require service 
                                                 
24 Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 7. 
25 Although the admiralty rules under AJRA seem to allow the institution of both actions at the same time, see 
Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 97, 184. See also MV Alina II (No 
2) Transnet Ltd v Owner of MV Alina II 2011 (6) SA 206 (SCA) at 211-212. 
26 Section 3(5) of AJRA. As said in chapter one, although there are five types of maritime property that may be 
arrested in rem viz., bunkers, containers etc, only a ship will be referred to in this thesis. This should be taken to 
include the other five types of property amenable to arrest in rem though unless otherwise stated. 
27 With the exception of course of associated ship arrests, see Wallis The Associated Ship and South African 
Admiralty Jurisdiction (2010) at 60-64. 
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of the summons on the person of the defendant28 (who is, by the very nature of the shipping 
trade, often domiciled abroad). Further, and more importantly, the different consequences 
between arrest and attachment are marked. Whether an action in rem is pursued over an 
action in personam will have a bearing on inter alia: the amount of security that may be 
claimed,29 the consequences of any submission to the court’s jurisdiction, the amount 
immediately available for satisfaction of a judgment, the enforcement of a successful 
judgment on other assets of the defendant, or whether whole new proceedings need be 
instituted.   
An action in rem may be instituted on the basis that the defendant who owns the 
property to be arrested would be liable on the claim in personam, or on the basis of a 
maritime lien.30 There can be no doubt that the concept of a maritime lien is one of the 
distinguishing features of admiralty law and has done much to shape the jurisprudence of the 
law in this area.31 Historically, it was seen as the necessary precursor to an arrest in rem – not 
that they were the same, but that the one could not exist without the other. Present 
interpretations of the action in rem have uncoupled this interdependent nature, clearly 
separating the maritime lien from the action in rem. Thus the dictum of Sir John Jervis in the 
Bold Buccleugh is not at present (nor has it been for a long time) accepted as good law:  
[W]herever a lien or claim is given upon the thing, then the Admiralty enforces it by a 
proceeding in rem, and indeed is the only Court competent to enforce it. A maritime lien is 
the foundation of the proceeding in rem, a process to make perfect a right inchoate from 
the moment the lien attaches; and whilst it must be admitted that where such a lien exists, 
a proceeding in rem may be had, it will be found to be equally true, that in all cases where 
a proceeding in rem is the proper course, there a maritime lien exists, which gives a 
privilege or claim upon the thing, to be carried into effect by legal process.32 
 
                                                 
28 The summons in an action in rem is usually served on the ship itself, Admiralty Rules, 1997 r 6(2) and 6(3). 
29 Security to release property under arrest is to the value of the ship arrested or to the value of the claim, 
whichever is the lesser amount (therefore the value of the ship under arrest represents the upper limit), 
Admiralty Rule 4(7). Property under attachment though may only be released upon security to the full value of 
the claim, Admiralty Rule 5(4)(a). 
30 Section 3(4) of AJRA and bar of course certain exceptions (true in rem claims) like a claim for possession, 
ownership or mortgage. 
31 See Meeson Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice 4 ed (2011) at 17-19. 
32 The Bold Buccleugh 1851 PC 261 at 284. 
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That a maritime lien is but one way of enforcing an action in rem cannot be doubted.33 
Therefore just because an action in rem is instituted does not mean that the underlying reason 
for doing so is a maritime lien.  
Historical interpretations of the maritime lien aside, its essential nature can best be 
described by the classic dictum of Sir John Jervis in the same case: 
A maritime lien does not include or require possession… [it is] a claim or privilege upon a 
thing to be carried into effect by legal process… . This claim or privilege travels with the 
thing, into whosesoever possession it may come. It is inchoate from the moment the claim 
or privilege attaches, and when carried into effect by legal process, by a proceeding in 
rem, relates back to the period when it first attached.34 
 
The quite startling results of the maritime lien may not be immediately apparent so it 
would be appropriate at this stage to briefly elaborate on some of these consequences. A 
maritime lien is a possession-less, unregistered (and therefore secret) security charge on a 
ship ranking highly35 if a fund is formed after a judicial sale of that ship. As a secret charge, 
the security can be executed against the ship in rem no matter who owns the ship at the time 
the security is enforced and even against a bona fide purchaser. Therefore a person quite 
innocent and in no way liable to the claimant may find his ship arrested to satisfy a pre-
existing maritime lien. His only remedy in such a case is a contractual one against the person 
who sold him the ship and who incurred the maritime lien (assuming there are no 
intermediate buyers and sellers in the chain).  
English and South African law recognise only six claims as giving rise to a maritime 
lien (salvage, bottomry and respondentia, damage done by a ship, crew wages, master’s 
wages, master’s disbursements).36 Other countries, like the USA recognise many more claims 
as giving rise to a maritime lien.37  
The major importance of the maritime lien in the context of this dissertation is that it 
relates back to the period when the facts underlying the claim first occurred. This is important 
for security purposes in that, the maritime lien holder’s security over the res commences 
                                                 
33 In the Henrich Bjorn (1886) 11 App Cas 270 the House of Lords settled a long running controversy by 
deciding that the number of claims giving rise to a maritime lien was not extended further than the original six 
by the addition, in the 1840 and 1861 Admiralty Acts, of new claims falling under the Admiralty Court’s 
jurisdiction. 
34 The Bold Buccleugh 1851 PC 261 at 284-285. 
35 Section 11(4)(c) to (e) of AJRA. 
36 The Halcyon Isle [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325 (PC) and Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity & Others 1989 
(4) SA 325 (A). 
37 Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) at 39. 
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when the events giving rise to the maritime lien (ie the underlying claim) occur and not when 
the maritime lien is enforced in court. A statutory lien on the other hand, arises only when the 
action in rem has been commenced in court. The accrual of the security in a statutory right of 
action in rem has been the subject of judicial comment in England and the topic there at least, 
would seem to be settled.38 On the other hand, in South Africa, there have been no cases on 
this issue and it is likely that a South African court, if faced with the question of when the 
statutory right of action in rem ‘accrues’, would come to a quite different result from the 
English Courts. 
II. The ‘statutory lien’ and the accrual of the security 
 
A maritime lien holder is thus a secured creditor from the moment the facts giving rise to the 
maritime lien occur. However, a maritime claimant who has a claim enforceable by an action 
in rem, though not one based on a maritime lien, does not become a secured creditor until he 
commences his claim. Up until that point, the claimant is in the same unsecured position as 
any other potential claimant. However, it is accepted law in England, as in South Africa, that 
by the enforcement of a statutory right of action in rem, the claimant gains a proprietary right 
in the res and thus becomes secured in his claim39 (pre-judgment security is, after all, one of 
the main virtues of an arrest in rem).40 The question which has arisen in England (though not 
yet in South Africa) is the point in time at which this security interest attaches to the res. This 
may not necessarily be the time at which the action is commenced and the two should be 
distinguished. A number of possibilities present themselves. Does the security accrue when 
the claimant issues his summons, or when the order for arrest is made, or when the arrest is 
actually executed?  
In the Monica S41 Brandon J decided that the crucial point is when the summons is 
issued. From then onwards, the claimant is a secured creditor (at least in respect of the sale of 
the ship). The judgment is instructive and some of its more salient features will be briefly 
summarised.  
                                                 
38 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA). 
39 Derrington and Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters (2007) at 14-15. The Cella (1888) 13 PD 
82 at 85, 87, and John Carlbom & Co Ltd v The Owners of the Zafiro [1960] P 1 at 11. 
40 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 at 207: ‘The usual object of suing in rem is to obtain security’. 
41 [1968] P 741. 
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The decision was reached in the context of a sale of a ship after the writ42 in rem had 
been issued but before service and arrest. Importantly, this was simply a claim for necessaries 
and thus did not give rise to a maritime lien. Of course, under usual circumstances, the person 
who would be liable on the claim in personam owns the ship at the time the claim arises and 
also at the time when it is enforced and so no issues arise. In this case however, the person 
liable in personam on the claim was not the same person against whom the writ was 
eventually served as the ship had changed hands in the interim. The question which thus 
arose was whether the action (a statutory right of action in rem) was maintainable despite a 
change in ownership in the ship to be arrested after issue but before service and arrest. 
Brandon J, both on the basis of past cases, and on the narrower basis of s 3(4) of the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1956,43 decided that from the time the writ is issued, the 
plaintiff becomes a secured creditor and is entitled to enforce his security by arrest 
notwithstanding a change of ownership after issue but before service and arrest. Although it 
was accepted that this may cause hardship for a bona fide buyer of a ship in that, the asset 
that he has just bought is now being arrested (and will eventually be sold and its proceeds 
distributed) on a claim for which he is not personally liable or responsible for in any way, this 
was dismissed on the grounds that this is a commonly assumed risk for buyers of ships in the 
context of maritime liens, that any potential buyer could do a due diligence to check whether 
any claims in rem had been issued at the admiralty registry, and that a buyer could put an 
indemnity in the sale contract.  
Of utmost importance, Brandon J remarked that there are three types of cases where 
the timing of enforcing a statutory right of action in rem may be important;44 when, as in this 
case, the ship is sold before or after the action is begun, when a question arises as to the 
ranking of claims (prior claims of course usually rank higher), and finally if the ship-owning 
defendant becomes insolvent. In all such cases, it is essential to know whether a claimant’s 
statutory right of action in rem is maintainable against third parties. On two occasions though, 
the judge warns against confusing the principles applicable to these three classes. Thus whilst 
the principle in a sale case might be that issue of the writ is the key point in time, this may not 
necessarily be so for the other two classes.45  
                                                 
42 This is equivalent in South Africa to the arrest warrant. 
43 Equivalent to s 3(4)(b) of AJRA which says that the owner of the property to be arrested must be liable on the 
claim in personam. 
44 The Monica S [1968] P 741 at 748-749. 
45 Ibid at 748-749 and 770. 
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This is an important caveat to the decision and would weigh heavily on any South 
African judge considering whether to follow the Monica S. This is because English admiralty 
law46 must be applied by a South African court exercising admiralty jurisdiction for any 
claim over which it had pre-existing jurisdiction47 (pre-existing the commencement, in 1983, 
of the AJRA). The case is obiter with regards to intervening insolvency matters then even if it 
is found that this issue is a matter over which a South African court had jurisdiction before 
1983 (and hence would be bound to apply English law, including the Monica S). The case is 
nevertheless very persuasive - all the more so since it has never been departed from in 
subsequent English cases.48  
After a lengthy review of past cases, Brandon J decided that even though some of 
them inclined towards arrest as being the crucial point in time that, on balance, it was the 
time when the writ is issued that is decisive. The judge went on to say that even if he were 
wrong regarding what past cases had decided, the meaning of s 3(4)49 of the Administration 
of Justice Act is ‘plain and seems to admit of only one construction’;50 that in terms of s 3(4) 
an action is ‘brought’ (and the jurisdiction of the admiralty division accordingly triggered) 
when the writ is issued. As a result of which a claimant is secured from the time the writ is 
issued. The crux of the reasoning appears from the following passage:  
It is, I think, important, when considering this passage, and other passages in later 
judgments on the same lines, to keep clearly in mind the distinction between having a right 
to arrest a ship in order to obtain security for a claim, and the actual exercise of that right 
by arrest. It is the arrest which actually gives the claimant security; but a necessary 
preliminary to arrest is the acquisition, by the institution of a cause in rem, of the right to 
arrest51 (my emphasis). 
 
With respect, rather than convince the reader of the cogency of the reasoning, this 
passage seems to in fact achieve quite the opposite. Even if the claim in rem is instituted and 
the claimant gains, as the judge says, a right to arrest, this is still only a right unperfected by 
any concrete action. Many claimants can be said to have a right to enforce their security – 
                                                 
46 This includes rules of English private international law: Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity & Others 
1989 (4) SA 325 (A) at 335G - 336C. 
47 Section 6 of the AJRA. 
48 See In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA). 
49 Section 3(4) states that a statutory action in rem may be brought for certain claims against a ship if the owner 
is liable in personam when the action is brought. The latter was wording was interpreted by Brandon J to mean 
when the writ was issued, The Monica S [1968] P 741 at 771. 
50 The Monica S [1968] P 741 at 772. 
51 Ibid at 754. 
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however unless a more concrete step is taken in the process (and it is submitted that the mere 
issue of a summons does not qualify), the right to security remains just that: a right to 
(enforce) security and not a secured right.  
The decision has been the subject of criticism locally. The reasoning in the Monica S 
is applicable only to situations where the ship has been sold after issue of summons. Section 
10 of AJRA states however that a maritime claimant is only protected against the owner’s  
insolvency or business rescue proceedings if the ship is actually arrested before insolvency or 
business rescue commences.52 Hofmeyr’s justified criticism is that it would be 
jurisprudentially unsound for the security interest to attach to the res at different times 
depending on whether the ship has been sold or has fallen into the insolvent estate.53 
Wallis54 criticises the applicability of the reasoning in South Africa on more technical 
grounds. Arrest is an essential requirement of the action in rem.55 Section 3(4)(b) of AJRA he 
argues, makes it clear that the owner of the ship to be arrested who would be liable on the 
claim in personam must own the ship both at the time the claim arises and when the claim is 
enforced by arrest: ‘[A] maritime claim may be enforced by an action in rem… if the owner 
of the property to be arrested would be [personally] liable.’ It is true that on a purely textual 
reading, s 3(4) does seem to say that only if the owner of the property is liable in personam 
may the ship be arrested. Therefore if the res changes ownership, then the person who now 
owns the property is not personally liable on the claim and consequently the res may not be 
arrested to begin an action in rem.  
Further, given that the doctrine of effectiveness is one of the underlying reasons for an 
attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction,56 it would seem far-fetched to claim that in South 
African law a claimant gains security at any time before actual attachment – if there is no 
attachment, what property could any judgment be enforced against for execution purposes? It 
is of course true that the doctrine of effectiveness should not be taken too far since courts 
have found that even property which bears no realistic value to the amount claimed, can 
nevertheless be attached,57 but this should not be taken as meaning that a South African court 
                                                 
52 See chapter five. 
53 Hofmeyr op cit note 24 at 129. 
54 Wallis M The Associated Ship and South African Admiralty Jurisdiction (2010) at 338-340. 
55 Section 3(5) of AJRA.  
56 Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court of Appeal 5 ed 
(2012) at 94. 
57 Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) at 300H-301C. 
18 
 
would consider a claimant secured merely because summons was issued. This issue has 
however never directly arisen in the South African law of attachments because the practice is 
that the summons in an action against a peregrinus will be issued only once there has been an 
attachment of property.58 This, it is submitted, goes some way to show that the courts will 
only assume jurisdiction once the claimant is secured and that this security arises not from the 
issue of a summons but from an actual attachment. 
Though it is accepted that admiralty has always been a separate civil jurisdiction with 
its own distinct rules, it seems less than logical in this situation that there should be such a 
fundamental difference between attachment and arrest. If the reasoning of the Monica S were 
accepted in South Africa this would mean that a creditor is secured in an arrest in rem by 
issue of the summons, whilst a creditor attaching in personam (following South African 
common law authority) would only be secured when the property is attached. And though 
this may seem like an acceptable difference between admiralty and parochial jurisdiction it 
must be remembered that the principles behind attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction 
are now also part of South African admiralty law: a maritime claimant can pursue her claim 
in rem or in personam.59 So this most important consequence cannot be argued away on the 
basis of a difference between admiralty and parochial law (which differences have always 
been accepted by the law - hence why admiralty survives as its own separate jurisdiction). 
The fundamental difference is now within admiralty for acts which are essentially the same: 
arrest or attachment provides security and a basis for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. 
No matter whether attachment or arrest is used, the security must accrue at the same time. 
Anything less would be irrational. 
The reasoning of the Monica S is also impeachable on another principle of South 
African law: that any changes in real rights should be made known (doctrine of publicity).60 
The trend in South African law has consistently been towards the elimination of secret rights 
in property. For example tacit hypothecs (South African common law security rights very 
similar to maritime liens)61 were all, bar the landlord’s tacit hypothec for arrear rent and the 
                                                 
58 Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court of Appeal 5 ed 
(2012) at 120-121. 
59 Sec 3(2) AJRA. 
60 Mostert and Pope The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) at 56. 
61 See further Hilton Staniland ‘Roman Law as the Origin of the Maritime Lien and the Action in Rem in the 
South African Admiralty Court’ 1993 5 SAMercLJ 276. 
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tacit hypothec under a hire purchase contract,62 abolished by statute even before Union.63 The 
creation of a right of security enforceable against third parties on the basis only that a 
summons has been issued is an inherently secret affair and it is submitted inconsistent with 
fundamental principles of South African law.64 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the landlord’s tacit hypothec for arrear rent is 
secured only when the landlord attaches the moveable property subject to the hypothec65 (and 
not at any time beforehand). Without an attachment, the landlord is not secured and in the 
event of the lessee’s insolvency, has only a preferent right to the proceeds of the 
hypothecated property.66 
Though impeachable on a great many grounds in English and South African law, it 
must be said that the Monica S is a very pragmatic decision reached by a most experienced 
admiralty judge (later Lord Brandon) to meet the specific exigencies of the shipping trade. It 
cannot be gainsaid that one of the basic underlying tenets of admiralty law is the greater ease 
with which maritime creditors can enforce their claims. This is often justified on the basis of 
the international, fast and very mobile shipping industry which makes it difficult for 
claimants to follow up debts. The Monica S remedies a rather obvious way for debtors to 
avoid their creditors: by selling the ship subject to a pending claim to a third party or, 
following the usual practice in the shipping trade, by setting up a new one ship company in 
the corporate group and transferring ownership to it.67 Brandon J was clearly alive to the 
stratagems employed by debtors in the shipping trade (one ship companies are rife). The 
decision can be more easily understood on this basis, though these factors are never explicitly 
mentioned in the judgment.68  
                                                 
62 See s 85(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
63 See Cape Tacit Hypothec Amendment Act 5 of 1861 ss 8–9; Transvaal Administration of Estates 
Proclamation 28 of 1902 ss 130–132; Natal Act 13 of 1887 s 5. The Cape and Natal measures have been 
repealed by the Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act 36 of 1976 s 1. 
64 Wallis op cit note 58 at 340. 
65 GF Lubbe ‘Mortgage and pledge’ in The Law of South Africa vol 17(2) Second Reissue (2008) paras 441-443. 
66 Section 85 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
67 For a case decided on these same considerations see The Helene Roth [1980] Q.B. 273 where the defendants 
transferred their ship to a newly set-up company in the corporate group after the plaintiffs had issued their writ 
but before the summons and writ were served, to avoid the claim. Needless to say, the change in ownership 
before service and arrest was not enough to defeat the plaintiffs’ irrevocably accrued right of arrest and the 
plaintiffs were allowed to arrest the ship. 
68 Mandaraka-Sheppard Modern Maritime Law 2 ed (2007) at 76. 
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However, the sale of the ship concerned to a one ship company to sever the in 
personam link necessary to found a statutory right of action in rem would be much less of a 
concern in South Africa. This is because the associated ship provisions in AJRA go far 
beyond any of the comparable sister ship provisions in the admiralty law of any other 
jurisdiction.69 English law is limited to the arrest of sister ships. A bogus sale to a one ship 
company within the same corporate group would thus defeat any action in rem founded on a 
statutory lien in England. Through its much wider associated ship provisions however, South 
Africa does not share this problem. It is thus arguable that one of the main considerations that 
occupied Brandon J’s mind would not be as important a factor in South Africa. 
The commencement of an admiralty action is obviously a critical stage to any creditor 
wanting to enforce security before the onset of insolvency or the involvement of other 
creditors who may also wish to enforce security rights against the ship. In England, the 
decision of Brandon J in The Monica S has stood unchallenged for nearly half a century – a 
maritime creditor is secured in a statutory action in rem from the moment the claim form 
(summons) is issued.70 The commencement of security for a maritime claimant in South 
Africa must however be considered an open question. It is submitted though that the proper 
approach in this country, dictated by logic and consistency, is that security commences in a 
maritime claim only once the ship is arrested or attached.  
 
                                                 
69 On the extended scope of South African associated ship arrests compared to sister ship arrests see Wallis op 
cit note 54 at 60-64. 
70 In the insolvency context too, The Monica S has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in In Re Aro Co Ltd 
[1980] Ch 196. 
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CHAPTER 3: CORPORATE WINDING-UP IN SOUTH AFRICA71 
 
 
In the above section, the time at which the security commences in an admiralty claim in 
South Africa and England was considered. In this section, insolvency and winding-up issues 
specific to admiralty are addressed. These include the commencement of insolvency (whether 
from the time of the notice of surrender, initial application, interim order, or final order), 
vesting of assets, and automatic stays. More specifically, it may be asked up until what point 
can a maritime creditor arrest a ship before it falls into the insolvent estate?  
Case law in both South Africa and England has answered these questions differently 
between the two jurisdictions. This is slightly curious since the legislation governing these 
issues in both countries is very similar. Indeed, many of the specific sections of the 
Companies and Insolvency Acts in South Africa which will be addressed in this chapter are 
worded almost identically to the comparable English provisions. Even within each 
jurisdiction, there have been some marked differences of opinion between courts, especially 
in England. The crucial difference is that South Africa, through the approach set out in s 10 
of AJRA, clearly sets out which court has jurisdiction over the matter and when. Section 10 
‘ring-fences’ maritime property arrested in admiralty from the parochial courts, leaving said 
property to be used to settle maritime claims only by the High Court when exercising its 
admiralty jurisdiction.72 In effect, that the estate of the debtor is split between maritime 
property and non-maritime property, with different procedures and different creditors entitled 
to participate in each.  
The focus here will not be on the requirements for winding-up but on the necessary 
steps leading up to the final winding-up order and the consequences of each these steps on the 
ability of a maritime claimant to enforce his claim. There are two ways of winding-up a 
company: voluntary and compulsory winding-up.    
 
 
                                                 
71 Given the rarity of non-corporate ownership of ships, individual insolvency (termed sequestration in South 
Africa and bankruptcy in England) will not be discussed. However, given that s 339 of the Companies Act, 1973 
explicitly incorporates parts of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, some reference to the latter Act will perforce be 
made. 
72 See section chapter 5. 
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I. The commencement of winding-up proceedings under the Companies Act 61 
of 1973. 
 
Although the 2008 Companies Act73 is in force and repealed the 1973 Companies Act,74 by 
virtue of item 9 of schedule 5 of the 2008 Act, the chapter on winding-up of companies in the 
1973 Act (chap 14) remains in force until the Minister decides that item 9 ceases to have 
effect. The Minister may only do so though if there is a substitute that adequately deals with 
the winding-up of companies.75 This is unlikely to happen in the near future until a new 
combined insolvency legislation is passed by Parliament. The result is that corporate 
winding-up in South Africa is still governed by Chapter XIV the Companies Act of 1973 
despite the repeal of that Act by the Companies Act of 2008. 
A company may be wound-up in one of two broad ways: voluntarily, or compulsorily. 
In the case of a voluntary winding up, the company must pass a special resolution. 
Importantly, the registration of the special resolution has certain effects. Section 352 provides 
that a voluntary winding-up commences not when the special resolution is passed by the 
company nor when the order for winding-up is made by the court, but when the special 
resolution is registered with the Companies Commission76 in terms of s 200. This must be 
done within a month of the special resolution.77  
A compulsory winding-up on the other hand, is deemed to commence at the time of 
the presentation to the court of the application of winding-up and not from the date of the 
winding-up order.78 
The importance of the deemed commencement date for compulsory windings-up, 
bearing in mind that a court has not yet considered the matter, lies in the following: that 
certain transactions may be made retrospectively void, including arrests or attachments in 
admiralty. Clearly by the time a court ruling is made on the merits authorising winding-up to 
actually commence, it would be too late for any creditor, including maritime ones, from 
                                                 
73 71 of 2008 (‘the Companies Act, 2008). 
74 Section 224 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
75 Item 9(4)(a) of sch 5 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
76 Now called the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPRO). See Chap 8 of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008. 
77 Section 352 of the Companies Act, 1973. 
78 Section 348 of the Companies Act, 1973. 
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enforcing any security in admiralty that they may have had.79 And by virtue of s 10 of AJRA 
(see chapter five infra), any arrest of a ship before the deemed commencement dates is also 
uncontentious in that such an arrest crystallises the admiralty division’s jurisdiction and 
excludes the parochial court’s jurisdiction. The crucial period for a maritime creditor then, 
over which there is uncertainty, is that between the deemed commencement dates and the 
order for winding-up.  
The question then arises for both voluntary and compulsory corporate winding-up: 
can a maritime creditor still seek to enforce his security between the deemed commencement 
date and the time when an order is made for winding-up by the court?80 Unlike English law, 
South African courts have answered the question negatively. Two provisions of the 
Companies Act, 1973 are particularly important in this respect: ss 358 and 359(1)(b).81 
Section 358 provides for the stay or restraint of proceedings against the company at 
any time between the presentation of the application for winding-up and the order for 
winding-up. So even before the court has ordered the company to be wound-up, s 358 allows 
creditors of the company or the company itself to apply for a stay for any proceedings against 
the company, as long as the application for winding-up has been presented to court. 
Importantly, and unlike s 359(1)(a) which is an automatic stay against all proceedings against 
the company from the time the winding-up order is made,82 s 358 does not depend on an 
order for winding-up having been granted. Instead, it can operate straight after the application 
for winding-up has been made. It is thus a powerful tool for creditors to protect the remaining 
assets of a company about to be declared insolvent. 
Section 358(a) states that the company (or any creditor) may approach the court in 
which any action or proceeding is pending against the company, and ask the court for a stay. 
‘Any action or proceeding’ are words of wide import and would safely cover both arrests in 
rem by summons as well as applications to attach in personam. This subsection though only 
covers proceedings which are pending. The solution for the concerned creditor is to approach 
the court in which the proceedings are pending to request a stay. This is unlike subsection (b) 
                                                 
79 Although see the obiter comments to the contrary by the court in the The Nantai Princess Line Co Ltd v 
Cargo Laden on the Nantai Princess 1997 (2) SA 580 (D) at 590-591. 
80 Or for voluntary winding-up, between the time the winding-up resolution is registered and the time the order 
is made for winding-up by the court. 
81 Given the importance of the two provisions, they are quoted in full in Annexure A. 
82 This includes a provisional winding-up order see sv ‘winding-up order’ in s 1 of the Companies Act, 1973. 
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where the creditors applying for a stay may approach the court in which the winding-up 
application is proceeding. 
It may be wondered whether, in the case of a maritime claim pending in admiralty, the 
court there would indeed grant a stay to the parochial creditor. It would depend on how far 
the maritime claim had proceeded. Of course, if the maritime claimant had already arrested, 
attached or security had been given, then s 10 of AJRA operates to exclude said property 
from falling into the insolvent estate; preferentially ring-fencing the property to satisfy only 
maritime claims. On the other hand it is an open question if the claim in admiralty, having 
been instituted,83 though not up to the stage of arrest, attachment or security, could proceed in 
the face of a stay application from a parochial creditor. Certainly no court in South Africa has 
been faced with such a question and so this must be considered an open question. 
 However, given that a parochial creditor would have to approach the court in which 
the action or proceeding is pending, being the admiralty division for our purposes, and ask 
that court to stop a maritime creditor from enforcing its security merely because an 
application had been made to court for winding-up (bearing in mind the possibility that such 
application may not be granted) would seem far-fetched. This is especially so because the 
admiralty division is specifically constituted for maritime claims. In effect, a parochial 
creditor would be asking the admiralty division to stay maritime claims, its raison d’être, in 
favour of parochial creditors merely because an application for winding-up has been lodged 
(and may not even be granted).  
Subsection (b) would seem to offer more certainty. It is concerned not with pending 
proceedings, but with proceedings which are about to be instituted. This would mean that the 
admiralty division would not have had any involvement in the matter. Also, rather than 
approaching the court in which the proceedings are pending for the stay, a creditor can now 
approach the court in which the application for the winding up of the company is pending. In 
                                                 
83 A common occurrence in admiralty is that creditors will issue their legal papers in anticipation of a ship’s 
arrival in a South African port (which may take many months or the ship may not even arrive) and hence that 
this would be an action or proceeding pending before the admiralty division. Section 1(2)(b) of the AJRA gives 
the plaintiff in an action in rem a year to serve his summons and arrest warrant. The AJRA also makes provision 
for the renewal of any process in s 5(2)(dA). Section 1(2)(a) of the AJRA also specifies that an admiralty action 
commences at the making of an application for attachment for an action in personam, by the issue of any 
process in an action in rem or by the giving of security. For the seminal English case on the practice in admiralty 
of issuing multiple writs in rem against all the ships owned by the defendant see the Banco [1971] P 137 (CA) at 
153 and 158. 
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the situation with which this thesis is concerned, this would essentially boil down to a home-
ground advantage for the parochial creditor. Under s 358(b), he would not have the 
paradoxical problem of approaching a court specifically constituted for maritime claims and 
ask that court to stay a maritime claim – as would be the case under s 358(a). Interestingly, s 
358(b) provides for a restraint order whilst s 358(a) speaks of a stay order.  
For a parochial creditor looking to stay proceedings initiated by maritime creditors 
there is however a problem with this section. It refers to restraining any ‘action or 
proceeding’. The wide import of the words ‘action or proceeding’ has already been noted and 
clearly includes action proceedings to arrest and application proceedings to attach. It would 
also cover proceedings in which the court is considering the sale of the ship. However, it 
would not seem to cover the giving of security, as this is not usually an ‘action or proceeding 
about to be instituted [in court]’. Section 10 of AJRA it will be remembered, is triggered by 
three events: arrest/attachment, sale and security. It is very common in maritime matters for 
security to be given to the creditor to avoid an arrest or to release property already under 
arrest.84 It is important here to distinguish the giving of security to avoid arrest and the giving 
of security to release already under arrest. In the latter case, the ship has already been arrested 
and thus s 10 of AJRA would already have been triggered to protect arrested assets (or the 
security substitute) from all except maritime claimants.  
Apart then from the unusual and slightly old-fashioned method of putting up bail to 
the court (which might be seen as a proceeding before the court) for the release of arrested 
property, the giving of security in admiralty is a private, contractual affair85 which cannot be 
described as an ‘action or proceeding’ nor, in the case of security to avoid arrest can it be said 
to be something that is ‘pending or about to be instituted in a court’.  
The essential problem for the parochial creditor in this instance would be that, though 
s 10 of AJRA has not yet been triggered, an application for winding-up has been made, he 
(the parochial creditor) would not be able to restrain or stay a debtor from giving security to 
avoid arrest under the admiralty procedure. This is because, as a private matter of contract 
between creditor and debtor, security here simply cannot be described as an action or 
proceeding before a court. A maritime creditor could thus successfully avoid the stay 
provisions of s 358 whilst crystallising the admiralty division’s jurisdiction (through s 10 of 
AJRA) by negotiating that the debtor give security to avoid his ship from being arrested. And 
                                                 
84 Section 3(10)(a) of AJRA. 
85  See The Merak S 2002 (4) SA 273 (SCA) at 278E-279J. 
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even though a parochial may be satisfied with this state of affairs since the ship, on the giving 
of security, is released from arrest and can thus form part of the insolvent estate, the amount 
of security given to release the ship might be a substantial depletion of the debtor’s assets just 
prior to winding-up.86 Arrest and attachment on the other hand could be stayed by the 
parochial creditor as these are both ‘actions or proceedings’, ‘pending or about to be 
instituted before the court’. And if these are stayed, then necessarily no security need be 
given by the shipowner (which could reduce the value of the latter’s estate). 
Also, whether a stay or restraint is requested, the court is given a broad discretion to 
‘stay or restrain the proceedings on such terms as it thinks fit.’ The authors of Henochsberg87 
suggest that this is a narrow discretion which should only be exercised in special 
circumstances. This is because once an order for winding-up is made, an automatic stay on all 
proceedings against the company is triggered by s 359(1)(a).  
Finally, it is certainly arguable that the restraining order in subsec (b) could operate 
generally; ie that all actions or proceedings about to be instituted are restrained. This is 
because the discretion refers to the court being able to order the stay or restraint of 
proceedings (plural). The heading of s 358 is also phrased in the plural to refer to stay of 
proceedings. On the other hand, the authors of Henochsberg88 posit the opposite; that because 
of the reference in both subsecs (a) and (b) to only an action or proceeding (in the singular) 
pending or about to be instituted, that a court may only stay or restrain individual cases.  If a 
general stay were ordered by one division of the High Court it would be hard to imagine in 
such circumstances another division proceeding notwithstanding a restraint order from a 
court which is its equal.89 Given that the admiralty division is structurally exactly the same as 
the High Court – indeed, it is part of the High Court (just exercising a different jurisdiction 
and applying a slightly different law). 
 
                                                 
86 Security in an action in rem must be to the value of the claim or of the ship, whichever is the lesser amount; 
the value of the ship thus represents the limit of security that can be demanded, Admiralty Rule 4(7)(a)(ii). In an 
action in personam on the other hand, security must be given to the full value of the claim even if this exceeds 
the value of the ship, Admiralty Rule 5(4)(a). 
87 Delport & Vorster (eds) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) vol 2, appendix 1 at 112. 
88 Delport & Vorster (eds) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) vol 2, appendix 1 at 112. 
89 See also the recent case of Overseas Shipholding Group Inc (KZD) unreported case no 12827/12 (7 December 
2012) where the court recognised the US chapter 11 bankruptcy order as well as the automatic stay provision in 
the US’s Bankruptcy Code (s 362) and ordered the stay to apply throughout South Africa.  
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II. Section 359(1)(b) and admiralty jurisdiction in South Africa 
 
Section 359(1) is broadly concerned with the situation after a winding-up order has been 
granted. Subsection (a) states that all civil proceedings against the company are automatically 
suspended once the order has been granted. Subsection (b) though, is for our purposes, as 
interesting as it is unclear. It states that any attachment or execution put in force against the 
company is void.  
The confusing part of subsection (b) is that it is structurally part of s 359(1) as a 
whole which operates from the date of the winding-up order.90 Based on this then s 359(1)(b) 
should also operate from the time of the winding-up order. The wording of this subsection 
though is at odds with the section as a whole since it states that any attachment or execution 
put in force against the company after the commencement of the winding-up shall be void. 
This particular wording has a familiar ring to it and brings us back to the deemed 
commencement provisions of s 348 which contains the similar formula: that the winding-up 
of a company shall be deemed to commence at the time the application is presented to court. 
Though the wording is slightly different (viz. ‘commencement of winding-up’ versus 
‘winding-up commences’), it would seem that the intention behind s 359(1)(b) is that it 
commences from the time the application is presented to court and not, as the rest of s 359(1) 
states, from the time the order for winding-up is made.91 Section 359(1)(b) would thus 
operate from the same time as s 358 operates: between application and order for winding-up. 
But whereas s 358 requires an interested creditor to approach a court to stay any proceedings, 
s 359(1)(b) automatically voids two specific proceedings against the company: ‘attachments 
or executions, put in force’ after the application for winding-up. 
Does s 359(1)(b) then mean that maritime creditors are barred from enforcing their 
rights in admiralty from the deemed commencement date of winding-up? Put differently, is 
an arrest or attachment in admiralty after the deemed commencement date (ie when the 
application is presented) automatically void? This could potentially have the effect that a 
maritime creditor would not have the benefit of s 10 of AJRA from the time ‘the application 
[for winding-up] is presented to court’. A maritime creditor may thus not be necessarily safe 
from parochial jurisdiction even after he has arrested in admiralty (thereby triggering s 10 of 
                                                 
90 LL Mining Corporation Ltd v Namco (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) SA 407 (C) at 413. 
91 LL Mining Corporation Ltd v Namco (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) SA 407 (C) at 413F-H. And cf the misleading 
headnote in the report which states that s 359(1)(b) operates from the winding-up order when in fact Davis J 
held that the section operates from the deemed commencement of the winding-up. 
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AJRA) if, before such an arrest, an application was made for winding-up since, such an arrest 
could be made retrospectively void according to s 359(1)(b).92  
For the purposes of this section, it is important to distinguish execution from 
attachment. Execution, it has been said, succeeds and does not precede judgment.93 Therefore 
an arrest in rem (or attachment) of a ship in admiralty, as a pre-judgment type process, could 
not be described as an ‘execution’ as that word has hitherto been interpreted. Case law in 
South Africa on the interpretation of s 359(1)(b) has stated that ‘execution’ means when the 
sheriff, in pursuance of a warrant of execution enters into possession of the property.94 So it 
would seem that an arrest or attachment in admiralty for the purpose of obtaining security 
cannot fit under the definition of execution in this section. This is because property is 
invariably arrested/attached in admiralty pre-judgment under an arrest warrant and not a 
warrant of execution (pre-judgment arrest is after all one of the main advantages of 
proceeding in admiralty). Also, as used in the commonly understood sense of the word, and 
in the sense used by s 359(1)(b), execution would not need to occur in admiralty. This is 
because, when arrested or attached, the ship is already under the admiralty division’s control 
and there would therefore be no need for a writ of execution if the admiralty division ordered 
the ship to be sold. It is therefore doubtful whether ‘execution’ in s 359(1)(b) was ever 
intended to apply to admiralty arrests or attachments. 
 Section 359(1)(b) also prohibits ‘attachment’ which would seem to include 
attachments to found or confirm jurisdiction. However, it would also seem that the reference 
in s 359(1)(b) to voiding ‘executions’ and ‘attachments’, could be limited only to post-
judgment, execution type processes. So even at common law, a creditor might be able to 
attach property to confirm or found jurisdiction (after commencement of the winding-up) and 
not be affected by s 359(1)(b). There does not seem to be any direct authority on ‘attachment’ 
as all reported cases deal only with the meaning of execution. However, an instructive case, 
                                                 
92 Unlike arrests or attachments being potentially void, security to avoid arrest cannot be said to be an 
‘attachment’ or ‘execution’ put in force against the company. Thus, getting security from the debtor without 
actually arresting (ie security to avoid arrest) after the commencement of the winding-up would thus be a good 
way to avoid s 359(1)(b) and also crystallise the admiralty court’s jurisdiction in terms of s 10 of AJRA. 
Granted, this would require a degree of cooperation seldom seen from any debtor, but it is possible. 
93 John Carlbom & Co Ltd v Zafiro (Owners) [1960] P. 1 at 15 
94 Pols v R. Pols-Bouers en Ingenieurs (Edms.) Bpk 1953 (3) SA 107 (T) at 110E-H, and Rennie No v Registrar 
of Deeds and Another 1977 (2) SA 513 (C) at 515. 
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Meaker NO v Campbell's New Quarries (Pty) Ltd and Others,95 seems to suggest that 
‘attachment’ is limited to post-judgment type processes only. This observation also finds 
support in a dictum of Jennett J where the judge seems to view attachment as one of the steps 
in the post-judgment execution process:96 'Execution includes attachment of the property and 
the sale of the property and it seems to me that to sell the seized property in execution is to 
put in force the execution.'  
English authority on the genesis of s 359(1)(b) would also seem to support this as all 
of their reported cases (dealing with the English statutory equivalents to s 359(1)(b)) limit the 
operation of the words ‘attachment and execution’ to post-judgment type processes only and 
not pre-judgment processes like an arrest in rem or an attachment to found or confirm 
jurisdiction.97 English case authority on their version of s 359(1)(b) has also consistently 
held, since In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company,98 that an arrest in rem is a 
‘sequestration’ and not an ‘attachment’ or ‘execution’; how then, if an arrest in rem is a 
sequestration, could it also be an attachment or an execution? 
In admiralty it would be quite important for a maritime creditor to know whether s 
359(1)(b) prohibits pre-judgment attachments, as an attachment in admiralty (like arrest) 
triggers s 10 of AJRA (which then crystallises the admiralty division’s jurisdiction over the 
arrested or attached property and excludes it from falling into the insolvent estate). So does s 
359(1)(b) prohibit pre-judgment attachments even at common law (and therefore by 
extension in admiralty)? Or is it, as the language of the section seems to suggest, concerned 
only with post-judgment, execution type processes? The argument in this dissertation is that s 
359(1)(b), just like its English forbears, was designed solely with post-judgment processes in 
mind therefore excluding from its ambit arrests in rem as well as attachments to found or 
confirm jurisdiction. For the maritime creditor this would then mean that an admiralty arrest 
or attachment effected after the commencement of the winding-up would not fall foul of s 
359(1)(b) and therefore not be void. This would ensure that maritime property remains under 
the admiralty division’s control to meet maritime claims. 
                                                 
95 1973 (3) SA 157 (R) at 162. 
96 Ex parte Flynn: In re United Investment and Development Corporation Ltd 1953 (3) SA 443 (E) at 445A. 
97 Although of course, it is important to remember that English law does not have an equivalent to the South 
African attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction (a pre-judgment process designed to gain security and 
personal jurisdiction over the peregrinus defendant). It is therefore unsurprising that their courts would never 
have considered the word ‘attachment’ as being anything other than a post-judgment type process. 
98 (1875) LR 20 Eq 325. 
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So it is certainly debatable whether s 359(1)(b) makes pre-judgment attachments or 
arrests in admiralty void after the contentious deemed commencement time of the winding-
up. Unfortunately for the maritime creditor in South Africa, there have been a few decisions 
on the interface of admiralty and insolvency law which dealt specifically with whether s 
359(1)(b) applies to admiralty arrests or attachments. From these decisions, it would seem as 
if the admiralty creditor would be deprived of the advantage of s 10 of AJRA if she arrests in 
rem (or attaches) between the deemed commencement and the actual commencement of 
winding-up. 
III. Cases of admiralty conflicting with insolvency law in South Africa 
 
Two quite recent cases best illustrate the problems for a maritime creditor in seeking to 
enforce a claim in admiralty against a company about to be declared insolvent: Rennie NO v 
South African Sea Products Ltd99 (Rennie) and The Nantai Princess Line Co Ltd v Cargo 
Laden on the Nantai Princess100 (The Nantai Princess).  
In both cases, an arrest in rem was effected prior to an order for winding-up being 
granted but after the application for winding-up had been made. In each case after the order 
for winding-up had been made, the respective liquidators applied to court under s 359(1)(b) 
of the Companies Act, 1973 to have the arrests declared void as the arrests had occurred after 
the commencement of the winding up in terms of s 348. 
Clearly, from the reference in s 359(1)(b) to ‘the commencement of the winding-up’ 
the intention was to make the section operative from the time set down in s 348.101 Section 
348 lays down that winding-up of a company by the court is deemed to commence at the time 
of the presentation to the court of the application for the winding-up (my emphasis). Despite 
persuasive argument to the contrary,102 both judgments held, in accordance with long-
standing practice,103 that the time the application is presented to court is the time when the 
application is filed with the registrar. This is despite the literal meaning of the words 
‘presented to court’ (and not to the registrar) as being the first hearing of the application by 
                                                 
99 Rennie NO v South African Sea Products Ltd 1986 (2) SA 138 (C). 
100 The Nantai Princess Line Co Ltd v Cargo Laden on the Nantai Princess 1997 (2) SA 580 (D). 
101 LL Mining Corporation Ltd v Namco (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) SA 407 (C) at 413C-H. 
102 Nantai Princess at 584G-586H. 
103 Relying on a case decided on s 348’s predecessor in the 1926 Companies Act Lief NO v Western Credit 
(Africa) (Pty) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 344 (W) at 348-349. 
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the court. It is also despite a slight change of language in s 348 from previous versions of the 
same section the older Companies Act 46 of 1926 (s 115). Whereas under its 1926 
predecessor s 348 said only that the deemed commencement is from the time the application 
is ‘presented’, s 348 further specifies that it is ‘presentation to the court’ which matters.  
Had the maritime creditors succeeded in their arguments that s 348 was operative not 
from the time the application is filed with the registrar, but at the later time of when it is 
heard in court for the first time, then this would have significantly increased the time in 
which all claims (including maritime ones) could be enforced without falling foul of s 
359(1)(b). As it was, the courts stuck with the long-established meaning of the provision.  
Once it had been established that winding-up was deemed to commence from the date 
the application is filed with the registrar, then, the arrests in rem having occurred afterwards, 
s 359(1)(b) came into play. Crisply, the question which arose for both courts was whether it 
could be said that an arrest in rem is an ‘attachment or execution put in force’. If it were, then 
the arrests by the maritime creditors would be void unless s 10 of the AJRA could be read so 
widely as to include arrests effected even after commencement of winding-up. 
Both cases accepted that the words ‘execution put in force’ meant the following: 
when, in pursuance of a writ of execution, the Sheriff enters into possession of the property, 
ie when execution is levied.104 This is according to long-standing practice in both England 
and South Africa.105 However, it cannot be said that an arrest in rem (or an attachment to 
found or confirm jurisdiction) is in pursuance of a writ of execution. On the contrary, by their 
very nature, these processes are pre-judgment type processes and not post-judgment. The 
only way then to fit an arrest in rem under s 359(1)(b) would thus be under the word 
‘attachment’. Berman AJ in Rennie sums up the problem in the following terms: 
[In no case previously decided] was consideration given to the situation where an 
attachment of property is effected by the Sheriff otherwise than pursuant to a judgment 
with a view to execution, and the question arises for what seems to me to be the first time 
in our courts as to whether an arrest of a vessel (or for that matter an attachment to found 
or confirm jurisdiction) is an ‘attachment’ within the meaning of the word as employed by 
s 359(1)(b) (my emphasis).106  
 
                                                 
104 See Rennie NO v Registrar of Deeds 1977 (2) SA 513 (C). 
105 Rennie NO v Registrar of Deeds 1977 (2) SA 513 (C) at 515-516A. 
106 Rennie at 143D-143E. 
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On this point, Levinsohn J in the Nantai Princess adopted the reasoning in Rennie 
verbatim.107 In the latter case, Berman AJ had essentially three main reasons for setting aside 
the arrest in rem in terms of s 359(1)(b).  
Relying on previous authority on the wide meaning to be attached to the word ‘any’, 
Berman AJ states that the section is wide enough to comprehend any restraint which may be 
imposed on a company’s assets, and that this includes arrests in rem. This is despite the clear 
wording relating to ‘attachments’ only and not arrests (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). 
The authority relied upon by Berman AJ for the wide meaning to be attached to the word 
‘any’ would also seem to be tenuous. He relied on the case of Hayne & Co v Kaffrarian 
Steam Mill Co Ltd 1914 AD 363. However, that case dealt with the meaning of the term ‘any’ 
in the context of a contract of sale. This is apparent from the case itself where Innes JA at 397 
says: ‘[I]n its natural and ordinary sense “any” - unless restricted by the context - is an 
indefinite term which includes all of the things to which it relates’ (my emphasis).108 It is 
submitted that conflating contractual and statutory interpretations is not appropriate109 – as 
Innes JA stated, context matters, and the context of a statutory provision which may have a 
profound effect on the rights of creditors should be restrictively interpreted. As stated by 
Snyman J in relation to the retrospective effect of s 348:  
Another aspect which I must bear in mind is that normally statutes must be interpreted in 
such a way as to cause a minimum of interference with, or deprivation of, rights. Sec. 115 
[now s 348] on occasion may be an interference with the rights of people who have 
legitimately acquired rights after the presentation of the petition for winding-up but before 
the order is granted by the Court.110 
 
Berman AJ’s second argument was that an arrest in rem has a far-reaching effect in 
that it affords the arrestor security where none previously existed and that it is precisely this 
sort of result which s 359(1)(b) seeks to avoid by fixing the rights of creditors inter se at the 
commencement of the winding-up. The first part of the argument is debatable because it fails 
to properly distinguish actions in rem based on maritime liens from those based on statutory 
                                                 
107 Nantai Princess at 589E-590A. 
108 See also similar reasoning in Birkenruth Estates (Pty) Ltd v Unitrans Motors (Pty) Ltd and Others 2005 (3) 
All SA 128 (W) para 31. 
109 Statutory and contractual interpretation are broadly quite similar, however the latter seeks the parties’ intent, 
whilst the former deals with objective purpose of statute in context. See Herbert Porter & Co Ltd and Another v 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange [1974] 3 All SA 543 (W) at 551,553. 
110 Lief NO v Western Credit (Africa) (Pty) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 344 (W) at 349B. 
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liens. As previously stated,111 a maritime lien holder is secured the moment the facts giving 
rise to the lien occur and not when it is enforced by an action in rem – therefore the security 
has been in existence long before winding-up commences.112 The second part of the argument 
is also debatable in that s 359(1)(b) does not fix the rights of the creditors inter se – that is 
achieved by the order for winding-up. Section 359(1)(b) is, like its insolvency counterpart in 
s 20(1)(a),113 concerned with stopping post-judgment type processes, like executions, against 
a debtor against whom winding-up proceedings have commenced. It also ignores the 
statutory preference given specifically to maritime creditors in s 10 of AJRA114 as well as the 
preference given to maritime creditors generally to proceed in rem directly against the ship 
itself to secure their claims.115  
His final reason seems slightly off-point. It is that an arrest in rem is the institution of 
an action, and no action, whether in rem or in personam may be instituted against an 
insolvent.116 This is certainly true in relation to processes commenced by anyone after the 
order for winding-up has been made (see the automatic stay provisions in s 359(1)(a)). The 
maritime creditors in Rennie though arrested the ship prior to the automatic stay and their 
actions were covered by the discretionary stay and restraint processes in s 358. So it is not 
true that the maritime creditors in Rennie were automatically precluded from arresting the 
ship – prior to the winding-up order they were in fact entitled to do so but that this type of 
process may be stayed or restrained by the court according to s 358. 
Section 359(1)(b) is not a new provision. Its roots can be traced to the 1862 and 1948 
English Companies Acts (ss 163 and 228 respectively).117 The language in all of the section’s 
guises is very similar except that the South African Companies Act is limited to ‘attachments 
and executions’, whilst the English Acts further include ‘distress and sequestration’ as acts 
against the company which are void (sequestration being defined in England as any detention 
of property by a Court of Justice for the purpose of answering a demand which is made).118 
One of the earliest cases, which incidentally, also concerned an arrest in rem, was In Re 
                                                 
111 See chapter two. 
112 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 205C. 
113 Of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
114 On which, see chapter five. 
115 See the Zafiro at 14-15 and The Heinrich Bjorn (1885) 11 App.Cas. 270 at 277.  
116 Rennie at 143. 
117 See annexure A. 
118 In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 325 at 326. 
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Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company119 where the court decided that an arrest in rem 
was a ‘sequestration’ and thus fell to be set aside as a void action against a company being 
wound-up. Importantly, it was not considered that an arrest in rem was an ‘attachment’ and in 
no case since, has it be held than an arrest in rem is anything other than a ‘sequestration’. So 
it would seem quite strange for a South African court interpreting what is essentially the same 
section, to view an arrest in rem as an ‘attachment’ when English cases have pointedly not 
used ‘attachment’ to describe the same act. Granted, ‘sequestration’ is not part of South 
Africa’s s 359(1)(b) but it is still an odd difference. 
In both jurisdictions however, no court has ever considered s 359(1)(b) as being 
applicable to pre-judgment type processes – all have dealt with the section as prohibiting 
post-judgment type processes. It must be acknowledged though that English common law has 
no direct120 equivalent to South Africa’s attachment to found or confirm jurisdiction and so it 
is unsurprising that there has been no reported English case of their version of s 359(1)(b) 
being applied to pre-judgment type processes outside of admiralty law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 (1875) LR 20 Eq 325. 
120 See however the special procedure of foreign attachment allowed only in the Mayor’s Court of the City of 
London in FL Wiswall The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since 1800 at 17. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ENGLISH LAW APPROACH 
 
The English approach to cases involving admiralty and insolvency has been rather different. 
Instead of deciding whether the admiralty division or any of the other divisions of the High 
Court have jurisdiction (as s 10 of AJRA forces South Africa courts to do), English law has 
approached the problem by asking whether the maritime creditor is a secured creditor – with 
varying results. Importantly, this is done solely through the lens of insolvency legislation. 
The result is a lack of any conceptual unity to the problem and an awkward straight-jacketing 
of admiralty processes in insolvency nomenclature. 
Ironically though, despite the lack of a specific statutory preference towards maritime 
creditors, as is achieved in part by s 10 of AJRA, English case law has evinced a remarkable 
bias towards maritime claimants by allowing them to proceed in circumstances where 
parochial creditors would not be allowed. For example in the Zafiro, the maritime creditors 
were allowed to proceed despite only having arrested in rem after the commencement of the 
winding-up. This they were allowed to do as English courts have a general statutory 
discretion to allow any creditor to proceed against the company or its property after the 
commencement of the winding-up. However this discretion is rarely exercised (apart from 
fraud) in favour of parochial creditors seeking to perfect a security right after the 
commencement of the winding-up – maritime creditors on the other hand, are permitted to do 
so.  
This ‘shipping bias’ has been achieved by extending the discretion, much debated but 
long accepted, that s 228121 voiding attachments, executions and sequestrations should 
nevertheless be read subject to s 231, which enables the court to allow ‘proceedings’ to 
proceed despite the order for winding-up having been granted.122  
I. Early cases 
 
One of the first reported cases on this issue was In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation 
Company123 where a creditor wanted to enforce a maritime lien by an arrest in rem (the claim 
being one for master’s wages) against a ship owned by a company that had already been 
                                                 
121 Of the Companies Act, 1948 (UK), see Annexure A. 
122 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 205A-B, the Constellation [1966] 1 WLR 272 at 274C.  
123 (1875) LR 20 Eq 325. 
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ordered to be wound-up. It was held that the arrest was a void ‘sequestration’ in terms of s 
163 of the Companies Act, 1862124 but that the arresting creditor could proceed in the 
winding-up proceedings. For Jessel MR this was not seen as a hardship on the maritime 
creditor as: ‘Instead of going to the admiralty court he could have applied to this court [ie 
chancery] by a process at least as cheap and at least as speedy as that of the admiralty 
court.’125  
This decision was also reached despite an interesting argument raised by counsel for 
the master: that the arrest in rem is an action against the ship itself and not against the 
company. This argument was never addressed by the court; though in a slightly different 
guise it rears its head again in the most recent case in England on the matter: Linabol.126  
In almost identical circumstances some two years later is the case of Rio Grande Do 
Sul Steamship Company.127 The master in this case attempted to enforce a pre-existing 
maritime lien for master’s disbursements128 in the chancery division (based on the authority 
of In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company) after the order for winding-up had 
been made. After a number of applications in admiralty and chancery,129 the master was 
given leave to proceed in admiralty. Even though this latter course of action was rendered 
unnecessary, as the liquidator put aside a separate sum in the liquidation to answer the 
master’s claim, an important point of principle does seem to be at stake in this case: how was 
In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company distinguished to allow the master to 
proceed in admiralty instead of in the liquidation, even though the facts of the two cases were 
nearly identical.  
                                                 
124 Equivalent to section 228 of the 1948 Companies Act (UK) and s 359(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1973 in 
South Africa, see table 1 on Annexure A. 
125 In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 325 at 327. 
126 See discussion in chapter six. 
127 (1877) LT 603; 5 Ch. D. 282. 
128 The master’s maritime lien for disbursements had been accepted since Dr Lushington’s decision in The Mary 
Ann Law Rep. 1 A. & E. 8 which was followed in The Feronia Law Rep. 2 A. & E. 65, and in The Ringdove 11 
P. D. 120. The House of Lords in Hamilton v Baker (The Sara) (1889) 14 App. Cas. 209 however, overruled 
The Mary Ann by deciding that the master of a ship did not have a maritime lien for necessary disbursements. 
The decision in The Sara was in turn reversed by statute, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 
167), which reinstated the position in Dr Lushington’s time, so that masters again had, and continue to have to 
this day, a maritime lien for necessary disbursements.  
129 (1877) LT 603 at 604. 
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Unfortunately for maritime creditors who only act after the winding-up order is made, 
the Rio Grande Do Sul seems to be a point less about principle and all about the unique facts 
of that case. The master in that case, advised by his solicitors, and based on the authority of 
In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 325, was told that the 
only way to enforce his maritime lien on a vessel belonging to a company ordered to be 
wound-up was in the liquidation proceedings and not by an action in rem in the admiralty 
court.130 However, this was found to be impossible since the mortgagees had taken 
possession of the ship and, due to the rules at the time, the chancery division did not have 
jurisdiction to summon the mortgagees before it. Thus the only option available to the master, 
and the order made by the chancery division was to grant the master leave to pursue his claim 
in the admiralty court. This approach was ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeal.  
In both these cases then, an arrest in rem was not effected (or if effected, was declared 
void) and the shipping claims of master’s wages and disbursements were dealt with in the 
parochial courts under insolvency legislation. Importantly though, and unlike later cases 
which deal only with statutory liens, these two cases concerned maritime claims giving rise to 
maritime liens. This is important since, regardless of whether admiralty or insolvency law is 
applied to these maritime creditors (and regardless also of the court which has jurisdiction 
over the matter) their claims are secured over the ship the moment the facts giving rise to the 
claim occur.131  
Three points emerge from these cases: first that an arrest in rem is a void 
‘sequestration’ in terms of the important s 163,132 and not an ‘attachment’ or ‘execution’.133 
Secondly, that after the order for winding-up has been made, the proper forum to enforce a 
maritime lien is not through the admiralty court with an action in rem but in the insolvency 
proceedings in chancery.134 Thirdly and most importantly, the court preferred to apply 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 The Bold Buccleugh 1851 PC 261, and In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 
325, where it is recognised by the court that a claim giving rise to maritime lien will be as secured in the 
proceedings of the Admiralty court as it would in the Chancery court. 
132 The foundation of s 228 of the Companies Act, 1948 (UK) and s 359(1)(b) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
in South Africa. See annexure A.  
133 Cf the decisions in South Africa, discussed in chapter 3.3 to the opposite effect. 
134 Cf the observations in In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 205C, relying on In re Rio Grande Do Sul 
(1877) LT 603; (1877) 5 ChD 282, where it was said that leave will automatically be given to the holder of a 
maritime lien to pursue his claim in admiralty even after a winding-up order has been made. This must be 
regarded as obiter as In Re Aro was concerned with statutory liens and not maritime liens. It also contradicts the 
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insolvency legislation nomenclature to shipping law issues. In the circumstances of this case, 
where the arrest occurred after the order for winding-up had been made this was probably fair 
to do. Unfortunately this case sets the tone in basic approach for all subsequent cases on this 
issue: the refusal to decide the case as a jurisdiction issue (ie which court should hear the 
matter), but, through the lens of company insolvency legislation, whether the maritime 
claimant is a secured creditor.  
II. Later cases  
 
The Zafiro135 is an interesting case as the maritime creditor was allowed to execute against 
the fund formed from the sale of the arrested ship even after the liquidation had commenced 
(and the creditor was also aware that the winding-up had commenced).136 The maritime 
creditor had arrested the ship in rem after the commencement of the winding-up. In spite of 
this, the chancery division137 had given the creditor permission to have the ship sold by the 
admiralty registrar despite the arrest being prima facie void under s 228 of the Companies 
Act, 1948.138 
The liquidator then tried to challenge the arresting creditor retaining the benefits of 
his execution under s 325 of the Companies Act, 1948. This is an interesting provision, not 
often used, which provides that no creditor may maintain the benefit of any attachment or 
execution against a company being wound-up unless such execution or attachment is 
                                                                                                                                                        
approach in the earlier case of In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 325 where 
a holder of a pre-existing maritime lien was ordered to proceed in chancery after the order for winding-up had 
been made. 
135 John Carlbom & Co Ltd v Zafiro (Owners) [1960] P. 1 (‘the Zafiro’). 
136 The ship owning company did in fact enter into a voluntary liquidation. Nothing though turns on this 
difference with other cases discussed in this dissertation as the steps leading to voluntary liquidation in England 
(notice of voluntary liquidation and special resolution) are analogous to the steps in a compulsory liquidation of 
presentation of the application to wind-up (which commences liquidation) and the order to wind-up. For the 
purposes of the discussion of this case, commencement and order will be used to keep the language and 
comparisons with other cases consistent. 
137 Which has jurisdiction over corporate windings-up. See s 61(1) and (3) read with sch 1 of the Supreme Court 
Act, 1981 (UK). 
138 The English equivalent to South Africa’s s 359(1)(b) voiding attachments and executions of the company’s 
assets  after commencement of the winding-up. Also In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) 
LR 20 Eq 325 which held that an arrest in rem is a ‘sequestration’ and is void if effected after the 
commencement of the winding up. 
39 
 
completed before the commencement of the winding-up (ie before the application for 
winding-up is presented to court). Additionally, if despite the creditor not completing the 
execution or attachment before winding-up commences, the court may exercise its discretion 
to allow him to do so.139  
Counsel for the liquidator had argued that the general policy of the courts was to stay 
all actions against a company where winding-up has commenced and that it was only in very 
exceptional circumstances that the court would depart from its general practice of staying 
actions against the company or its assets as any execution would necessarily interfere with 
the distribution of the assets pari passu.140  
The court’s reasoning was quite straightforward and it was that simply, s 325 did not 
apply to this case. This is because only attachments or executions are not allowed to be 
retained in terms of s 325 (the court only considered whether an arrest in rem was an 
‘execution’ and did not consider whether it could have been an ‘attachment’). Two reasons 
militated against the argument that an arrest of a ship in rem is such an execution in the eyes 
of the court: first, execution follows judgment whilst an arrest in rem precedes it.141 Also, 
unlike s 228 which includes sequestrations as well as attachments and executions, s 325 only 
specifies executions and attachments. As In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company 
decided however, an arrest of a ship in rem is a sequestration (by implication excluding an in 
rem arrest from being an attachment or execution).142 Even if this were wrong though, the 
court would still have exercised the discretion given to it under s 325(1)(c) to allow the 
shipping creditor to proceed because: 
 Necessaries men are given a right to secure the risks they take in catering for shipping, 
and if they exercise their rights without undue delay their rights to become secured 
creditors should be respected and enforced.143  
 
The exercise of the discretion in this manner, ie in favour of allowing specifically 
maritime creditors leave to proceed after the commencement of the winding-up, in 
circumstances where parochial creditors would not be so permitted, is a trend in later cases. It 
may be noted that the Zafiro is the only case to have dealt with an application under s 325 
whilst other cases have dealt with ss 228 and 231. The discretion, whether to allow the 
                                                 
139 Section 325(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 1948 (UK). 
140 Quoting Anglo-Baltic & Mediterranean Bank v Barber & Co [1924] 2 KB 410. 
141 The Zafiro [1960] P. 1 at 14. 
142 In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 325 at 326. 
143 The Zafiro [1960] P. 1 at 16. 
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creditor to execute under s 231, or to maintain the benefit of his execution or attachment s 
325, has however been held to be the same:144 to do what is right fair in the circumstances. 
Though creditors will only be given leave to proceed after commencement in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.145  
In the Constellation,146 leave had already been given by the chancery division for the 
sale of three vessels arrested after the commencement of winding-up. In the course of his 
judgment Hewson J makes a number of important points. First, that it is important that ships 
arrested (as a diminishing asset) be sold as soon as possible and should get the best possible 
price. Both of these are best achieved in the admiralty division which is familiar with the 
ship-broking market.147 More importantly, in order to achieve the best possible price a 
purchaser must be assured that the ship is free of all liens and encumbrances – such a sale is 
only possible in the admiralty division.148 
Hewson J also reviews the case history on the relationship between ss 228 and 231 of 
the Companies Act, 1948 commenting that the interpretation that s 228 must be read subject 
to the discretion is s 231 is strained, though despite much criticism, has long been accepted 
by the courts.149 Section 228 it will be recalled, voids attachments, sequestrations and 
executions put in force against a company after the commencement of the winding-up, whilst 
s 231 provides that despite an order for winding-up having been made, the court may, in its 
discretion, allow an action or proceeding against an insolvent company to be continued.150 
The court accepted this long-standing construction of the Companies Act, 1948 and allowed 
the maritime creditors to proceed against the ships by having the ships sold in admiralty and 
for the distribution of the fund to be in the normal manner in admiralty.151 
A most important case on this issue is In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 96 in the Court of 
Appeal which also reiterated an important point of admiralty procedure in respect of the 
consequences of caveats. The result, ultimately granting the maritime creditor leave to 
                                                 
144 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 200H-201A and 209F-H. 
145 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 204G. 
146 [1966] 1 WLR 272.  
147 The Constellation at 274. 
148 Ibid and see also the Goulandris [1927] P. 182 at 193-195 and In Re Aro [1979] Ch 613 at 627D.  
149 Since the case of In Re Great Ship Co. (1863) 4 De GJ. & S. 63. 
150 See the Constellation [1966] 1 WLR 272 at 275 for a summary of the arguments against reading s 228 
subject to s 231. 
151 The Constellation at 276. 
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proceed under s 231, was fair and correct. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal continued the 
trend of looking at whether the maritime claim was secured in terms of insolvency legislation 
instead of, as the court a quo had attempted,152 to see this as a problem of overlapping 
jurisdiction.  
The facts of the case were that the defendant company’s ship had already been 
arrested in rem by another creditor (Shell) on a claim for bunkers and the ship was therefore 
already under the admiralty division’s control. The plaintiff had a claim for short delivery of 
cargo but instead of re-arresting the ship, the plaintiff adopted the quicker and cheaper course 
of having a caveat issued against release in the admiralty registry and then issuing summons. 
This is the standard procedure for any subsequent shipping creditor – to enter a caveat rather 
than arrest the same property again. So far then, the plaintiff had done everything that was 
expected of it except serve its summons.153 An application was then made by another creditor 
of the ship-owning company to have it wound-up, which order was granted shortly thereafter. 
So in an application for leave to continue its action in rem under s 231 the question was 
whether the mere issue of the summons in addition to the entry of the caveat against release, 
the plaintiff had become a secured creditor (as against the liquidator of the insolvent estate).  
This was a very similar issue to that which arose in the Monica S.154 But whereas that 
case dealt with whether a shipping creditor who had issued a summons in rem without having 
served or arrested the ship could proceed against a bona fide subsequent purchaser of the 
ship, this case dealt with whether the plaintiff who had only issued a summons in rem (and 
entered a caveat) could nevertheless proceed against the ship when the ship-owning company 
had subsequently been wound-up. 
The court made its approach very clear – whether the plaintiff’s application should be 
upheld depended on whether, by issuing the writ in rem and entering a caveat against release, 
they had attained the status of secured creditors.155 Really though, given the straightforward 
reasoning on caveats, this case, like the Monica S, centred on whether issue of the writ was 
enough to secure the plaintiff’s claim. As an alternative approach156 the court also held that 
                                                 
152 In Re Aro [1979] Ch 613 at 637 where Oliver J in the court a quo had attempted to link the time at which the 
maritime claimants became secured with the invocation of the Admiralty court’s jurisdiction – in effect, a 
mixture between the jurisdiction and secured creditor approaches.  
153 In re Aro [1980] Ch. 96 at 202H. 
154 [1968] P 741. See also the discussion of the Monica S at pp14-17 supra. 
155 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 207. 
156 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) from 209.  
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even if it were wrong to view the plaintiff as a secured creditor, that it was right and fair to 
allow the claimants to proceed under the discretion in s 231.  
A side-issue to this case, though an important point for admiralty creditors who only 
enter a caveat against the ship’s release, was that a caveat should essentially be considered to 
be the equivalent to arrest.157 This is may not such an important point in England where a 
maritime creditor becomes secured on issue of summons (and therefore arrest/caveat or its 
absence is immaterial),158 though it would be an important and persuasive re-statement of 
principle for South African admiralty law. The result is that even if the reasoning of the 
Monica S is not accepted in South Africa, a maritime creditor seeking to enforce her claim 
after the ship against which his claim lies has already been arrested, should be satisfied that 
the effect of entering a caveat is equivalent to arrest. 
Turning to the main point of the case, it will be recalled that Brandon J in the Monica 
S had identified three scenarios in which it would be important to identify when the maritime 
claimant’s security accrues in an action in rem: if there has been a sale of the ship after issue 
but before arrest, when priorities arising from an admiralty sale are in issue, and also when 
the ship-owning company goes insolvent.159 In the Monica S the problem was the sale of the 
ship after the creditor had issued his writ and Brandon J was particularly careful to confine 
his reasoning solely to the scenario he had to decide. So much so that, at two separate points 
in his judgment,160 he warns against using the reasoning he employs to the two other factual 
scenarios, saying there would be different considerations in the latter two scenarios.161  
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal does not heed these warnings, indeed, does not 
even refer to them anywhere in its judgment. Instead, the reasoning in the Monica S is wholly 
endorsed in the following two passages: 
The case [the Monica S] is of critical importance to our decision because, applied to the 
instant case, it means that, had the liquidator sold the ship, he could only have sold subject 
to the plaintiffs' claim.162  
 
And later: 
                                                 
157 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 210.  
158 See discussion of the Monica S at pp14-17 supra. 
159 Monica S [1968] P 741at 749.  
160 Monica S at 749 and 771. 
161 Indeed, in his lengthy and thorough review of past cases on the matter, Brandon J acknowledged that the 
cases on admiralty and insolvency all favoured arrest, and not issue, as being the critical point at which the 
maritime creditor could be said to have a secured right, the Monica S at 771. 
162 In Re Aro at 208B.  
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If it is correct to say, as was not challenged in the court below and is not challenged in this 
court,163 that after the issue of the writ in rem the plaintiffs could serve the writ on the Aro, 
and arrest the Aro, in the hands of a transferee from the liquidator and all subsequent 
transferees, it seems to us difficult to argue that the Aro was not effectively encumbered 
with the plaintiffs' claim. In our judgment the plaintiffs ought to be considered as secured 
creditors for the purpose of deciding whether or not the discretion of the court should be 
exercised in their favour under section 231.164  
 
As the above passages show, the Court of Appeal assumed the correctness of the 
Monica S in order to reach its decision. It is unfortunate that the court did not use the 
opportunity in this case to put the reasoning in the Monica S under closer scrutiny. If 
however, the Monica S is acknowledged as good law, then the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is 
sound, for if one accepts the proposition that the burden of the statutory right of action in rem 
travels with the ship into a new purchaser’s hands after issue, with the result that the 
liquidator could only transfer the ship to the new purchaser subject to this burden, then it 
would be almost impossible to argue that the ship was not subject to the plaintiff’s claim and 
that they were thus a secured creditor. Of course, this also reinforces the principle that it is 
only the admiralty division which may sell a vessel free of all liens, charges and 
encumbrances. A liquidator and even another court would only be able to sell a ship subject 
to these liens, charges and encumbrances.165  
The court’s alternative approach was that the dispensing power in s 231 depended not 
on whether the plaintiff was a secured creditor, but on the court’s discretion. So that even if it 
was wrong to view the plaintiff as a secured creditor, the court would have in any event 
exercised its discretion in its favour.166 The test for the discretion in s 231 was whether it was 
‘right and fair’ to grant the plaintiff leave to proceed with its action. The court went on to 
hold that this is the same test as that required by s 325(1)(c) (creditor maintaining benefit of 
execution or attachment not completed before commencement of winding-up). Under the 
circumstances of this case, where the plaintiff was found to be a secured creditor well before 
even the commencement of the winding-up, the exercise of the court’s discretion was 
undoubtedly correct and in harmony with other cases allowing non-maritime creditors leave 
to proceed against a company ordered to be wound-up. The discretion in ss 231 and 325 
                                                 
163 This is unsurprising seeing as the liquidator chose not to be represented at the appeal. Had he been, the 
decision in the Monica S would undoubtedly have been put under closer scrutiny.  
164 In Re Aro at 209C.  
165 See also the Goulandris [1927] P. 182 at 193-195. 
166 In Re Aro at 209E-H. 
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though, has been enlarged by English courts looking to favour shipping creditors in 
circumstances where parochial creditors would, under similar circumstances, not be allowed 
to proceed with their action.167 
Finally there is the most confusing case of all: Linabol168 - surely a prime example of 
the shortfalls of the English approach and why a simpler approach, along the lines of s 10 of 
AJRA, would be beneficial to English law. In this case the plaintiffs applied for leave in the 
chancery division to proceed with their actions in rem in admiralty against the ship Bolivia 
though they issued their writs after commencement of the winding-up. The ship had however 
already been arrested in rem before the commencement by another creditor, Tramp Oil. This 
creditor had also obtained an order in the admiralty division for the appraisement and sale of 
the Bolivia which was granted by the admiralty division (even though the winding-up had 
already commenced).169 The question was thus whether the creditors (the plaintiffs) who had 
only issued their writs after commencement of the winding-up should be granted leave to 
proceed and participate in the distribution of the fund under ss 128 and 130 of the Insolvency 
Act, 1986 (UK).170  
At the outset it must be stated that the advantage of the jurisdiction approach to a case 
such as this one is manifest. In this case, a shipping creditor was forced to approach the 
chancery division for leave to participate in the distribution of the fund of a ship that had 
already been sold by the admiralty division.  
Given the complexity of the issues involved and the differences in the past cases as 
well as the fact that a judge not trained in admiralty matters was asked to resolve the issue, it 
is unsurprising that the reasoning employed by the judge is at times, confused and 
contradictory. For instance, the liquidator challenged the issue of the plaintiffs’ writs as being 
a void sequestration under s 128 (formerly s 228). One of the problems faced by Arden J in 
this regard was that, under the secured creditor approach set down by the Court of Appeal in 
In Re Aro, the plaintiffs became secured in their claim on the mere issue of writ. However, 
they had done so after commencement of the winding-up. But, the mere issue of a writ is not 
                                                 
167 See the discussion of ‘shipping bias’ in English law at pp 49-51 infra. 
168 Lineas Navieras Bolivianas SAM [1995] BCC 666.  
169 Leave had been given by the chancery division, in a separate application, to Tramp Oil to proceed with its 
action and for an order for the sale of the ship, subject to Tramp Oil getting further leave by the chancery 
division for the distribution of the fund. 
170 Nothing turns on the change in legislation: ss 128 and 130 of the Insolvency Act are the exact same as ss 228 
and 231 of the Companies Act, 1948. See annexure A. 
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enough to trigger s 228 voiding certain proceedings after commencement of winding-up, as 
issuing a writ is not a ‘sequestration’. So the plaintiffs had essentially secured their claims 
after commencement of the winding-up – surely a ‘sequestration’ or ‘attachment’ by stealth 
and therefore an unfair result for unsecured creditors. Under this seemingly contradictory 
approach, there was nothing in the insolvency legislation to stop the plaintiffs from securing 
their claim by issuing their writ. On the other hand, and in the maritime claimant’s favour, 
Arden J was faced by the reality that the ship had already been legitimately arrested and sold 
in admiralty for another creditor. There was also the practical reality that refusing the 
plaintiffs leave would result in an undeserved boon for Tramp Oil, the creditor that first 
arrested the ship in admiralty, in that it would be free to claim against the fund without any 
competing claims. The ultimate result, granting the plaintiffs leave to proceed was correct, if 
only for the reason that the practical consequences of refusing leave would have meant an 
unexpected and undeserved windfall for Tramp Oil.   
One of the liquidator’s arguments was quite interesting and was something that was 
first raised in In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company.171 The argument,172 
following the well-established rule of English insolvency law laid down in Ayerst v C & K 
(Construction) Ltd,173 was that, at the commencement of the winding-up, the assets of the 
company passed into a statutory scheme of arrangement with the result that the necessary 
unity of ownership to launch a statutory action in rem was missing (ie the liquidator now 
‘owns’ the ship concerned and not the person who would be liable on the claim in 
personam).174 This argument was never addressed directly by Arden J who instead, chose to 
turn it on its head.  
The crux of her argument turned not on the commencement of the winding-up as the 
liquidator had contended, but on the sale of the ship ordered by the admiralty court: 
The effect of the order for sale made by the Admiralty Court on the assets of the company 
must, it seems to me, have been to convert the company's interest in the ship into a right to 
receive the balance of the proceeds of sale remaining after satisfaction of the prior 
claimants. As a result of conversion it would appear that the present applicants do not in 
                                                 
171In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 325.  
172 Linabol at 675. 
173 [1976] AC 167. 
174 Under s 20 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 it will be recalled that in order to enforce a statutory lien, the 
person who would be personally liable on the claim must own the ship. The same rule applies in South Africa, 
see s 3(4) of AJRA. 
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fact require leave under s. 130(2) because they are not proceeding against either the 
company or the company's property (my emphasis).175  
 
This has been subject to rightful criticism by Derrington176 who argues that carried to 
its logical conclusion, this argument would mean that any subsequent creditor in admiralty, 
after the ship had already been arrested and sold, would not be able to enforce his statutory 
lien against the resulting fund.177 This just cannot be the case as the admiralty rules in 
England (as well as South Africa) oblige maritime claimants to claim against the fund instead 
of the ship.178 This was a somewhat surprising conclusion to reach as Arden J had in fact 
referred to this feature of admiralty law earlier in her judgment.179 Thus she quotes 
Meeson,180 and The Acrux181 both of which state that that after a sale in admiralty all 
maritime claims can only be enforced against the fund formed from the sale of the ship. Thus 
a sale in admiralty cannot have the effect, as Arden J contends, to convert the company’s 
interest in the ship into a right to receive the balance of proceeds for otherwise, and contrary 
to long-standing admiralty law and practice, subsequent claimants in rem would not be able 
to enforce their claims against the fund.  
III. Comments on the English approach 
 
Unlike the court a quo in the Aro case,182 which had attempted to view this as a problem of 
overlapping jurisdiction, all the cases surveyed chose to continue the trend of deciding 
whether a maritime creditor was a secured creditor in terms of insolvency legislation before 
allowing him to continue his action in the admiralty division. For maritime creditors in 
general this is a less than satisfactory approach as it multiplies the legal proceedings they 
have to launch in a number of courts, as well as providing the liquidator with the opportunity 
of challenging their claims on a number of grounds in the insolvency legislation (viz., stays 
and restraints in s 231, void executions or sequestrations in s 228, and retaining the benefit of 
                                                 
175 Linabol at 676.  
176 Sarah Derrington ‘The Interaction between Admiralty and Insolvency Law’ (2009) ANZMLJ 30. 
177 Sarah Derrington ‘The Interaction between Admiralty and Insolvency Law’ (2009) ANZMLJ 30 at 33. 
178 In England r 31 of the Admiralty Rules 1988 and r 4(4) and r 6(3)(e) of the Admiralty Rules 1997 in South 
Africa. 
179 Linabol at 670. 
180 N Meeson Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice (1993). 
181 The Acrux [1965] P. 391. 
182 In Re Aro [1979] Ch 613. 
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uncompleted attachments or executions in s 325). For example, the maritime claimant in the 
Zafiro had already been given leave by the chancery division to proceed with its arrest in rem 
under s 231 of the Companies Act, 1948 despite the fact that the winding-up had already 
commenced. The liquidator then decided to further challenge the maritime claimant by 
making an argument under s 325 of the Companies Act, 1948. And in In Re Aro, a 
straightforward claim for short delivery of cargo became subject to numerous applications 
and counter-applications, in both admiralty and chancery, and then even had to go on appeal.   
Far better would it have been for the English courts to borrow from South Africa’s s 
10 of AJRA and view this as a problem of overlapping jurisdiction. All the more so in those 
cases183 where the subject matter of the overlapping jurisdiction, the ship, was already under 
arrest in admiralty at the instance of other maritime claimants. If this approach had been 
adopted in those cases, the maritime claimants could all have submitted their claims for 
determination in the court specially designed for their claims, and the residue of whatever 
would have been left of the judicial fund after the sale of the ship could then have been 
transferred to the liquidator. This is fairer to maritime creditors who often assume risks of a 
special nature due in part to the international nature of shipping.184 It is also far simpler and 
more efficient than the approach hitherto adopted by the English courts asking whether each 
shipping claimant is a secured creditor (on the basis of a maritime or statutory lien, before or 
after the commencement of the winding-up, or the order for winding-up).  
Of course this would mean that parochial creditors would first have to wait for all 
concerned maritime creditors to have their claims satisfied. Although this may seem unfair at 
first glance, the only ground for the parochial creditors to apply for winding-up in the first 
place is because the ship is within the courts’ jurisdiction. But often, the only reason why the 
ship is within the jurisdiction in the first place is because it has been arrested in admiralty 
under that court’s wide jurisdiction.185 As remarked in a case involving, as is often the case, a 
foreign ship owning company: ‘had the admiralty jurisdiction not been invoked, there would 
have been no basis upon which parochial creditors would have been able to commence 
                                                 
183 The Constellation, In Re Aro and Linabol. 
184 See the comments by Hewson J in The Zafiro [1960] P. 1 at 14-15. 
185 This is because most of the cases deal with ships owned by foreign companies, registered outside England. 
Thus the only ground of jurisdiction for the court to liquidate these foreign or external companies is by the 
presence of movable property within the court’s jurisdiction, see ss 399-407 of the Companies Act, 1948 (UK) 
and s 337 read with s 1 sv ‘external company’ and ‘place of business’ of the Companies Act, 1973 (SA). 
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winding-up proceedings.’186 So without a maritime claimant first arresting the ship in 
admiralty, there would be no basis whatsoever for a parochial creditor to claim the chancery 
division’s jurisdiction to order a winding-up over a foreign-based company. 
Further it ensures that all maritime claimants are treated equitably. In other words, the 
jurisdiction approach ensures the priority of all maritime claims inter se against the res. Say 
for instance, on the facts of In Re Aro, the plaintiff had issued its claim in admiralty only after 
the commencement of the winding-up and had therefore not become a secured creditor with 
the result that it would have had to pursue its claim with the liquidator. The creditor who had 
arrested the ship in rem before commencement of the winding-up on the other hand, would be 
allowed to continue its action in admiralty and therefore completely satisfy its claim first. Of 
course, this would be unproblematic if the fund formed from the sale of the ship was large 
enough to cover all claims against it, but this is rarely the case, as in In Re Aro. The result 
would be a disturbance of the priorities between maritime claimants, with one being allowed 
to satisfy its claim first admiralty, whilst the other would have to be satisfied with whatever 
residue is left and would, in addition, have to compete with the parochial creditors. Such a 
result could even be open to abuse by maritime creditors seeking to steal a march on other 
maritime creditors by arresting in rem and shortly thereafter, commencing winding-up 
proceedings, thereby locking out other maritime creditors from enforcing their claims in 
admiralty.  
Finally, it would also go a long way to ensuring that maritime assets are dealt with in 
the court specially designed for them. It must be remembered that it is only the admiralty 
division which can sell a ship free of all liens and charges187 and this is accepted in 
international conventions.188 So it is only the admiralty division which can fetch the highest 
price for the ship – surely the most efficient and advantageous outcome for all creditors.  
 
 
                                                 
186 Linabol [1995] BCC 666 at 673. 
187 The Goulandris [1927] P. 182 at 193-195, the Constellation [1966] 1 WLR 272 at 274A, the Acrux [1962] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 405, the Tremont (1841) 1 W Rob 163, and N Meeson Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice 4 ed 
(2011) at 220. 
188 See Linabol at 673, the Cerro Colorado [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58 at 61, and the International Convention for 
the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1926. 
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IV. Shipping bias in English courts: s 231  
 
The object behind s 228 and its predecessors is of course to help ensure the equal and 
unhindered collection and distribution of assets. This principle has long been recognised. In 
the words of Sir R Malins VC: ‘the object of the Act being to secure as far as possible the 
equality of payments amongst all creditors’.189 Any action which disturbs this balance is void 
subject to the safety valve in s 231 which allows the court to exercise its discretion and allow 
the creditor to proceed after commencement of the winding-up.  
The trend in the English cases seems to be based around the concept of a ‘secured 
creditor’. The importance of such a classification for maritime creditors can be seen from the 
following dictum in In Re Aro: 
Most of the cases deal with shipping creditors by classifying them as secured creditors. 
The approach seems to be that a creditor who is secured is outside of the liquidation as he 
is claiming his own property. Sections 228 and 231 apply to secured as well as to 
unsecured creditors. But a secured creditor is in a position where he can justly claim that 
he is independent of the liquidation, since he is enforcing a right, not against the company, 
but to his own property: see In re David Lloyd & Co. (1877) 6 Ch.D. 339, a case under the 
predecessor of section 231.190 
 
However, nearly all of the cases also argue the alternative approach of allowing 
maritime creditors to proceed with their claims, notwithstanding the commencement of 
winding-up, not on the basis of whether they have a secured claim, but on the discretion in s 
231 and 325 of Companies Act, 1948. In other words, the policy of the English courts seems 
to be that maritime creditors would in any event be given leave to continue with their actions 
against the ship, even though these proceedings were initiated after the commencement of the 
winding-up. 
The discretion in both s 231 and s 325 is for the court to do what is right and fair in 
the circumstances:191 in general, a creditor who has commenced proceedings before the 
commencement of the winding-up should be allowed to continue once winding-up 
commences. However it is only in special circumstances that a creditor would be allowed to 
commence proceedings once winding-up has commenced.192 This of course, ties in neatly 
                                                 
189 Re London and Devon Biscuit Co (1871) L.R. 12 Eq. 190 at 193. See also Turner LJ in Smith, Fleming & Co. 
Law Rep. 1 Ch. 538 at 545 and Anglo-Baltic and Mediterranean Bank v Barber & Co. [1924] 2 KB 410 at 418 
and Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd (In Liquidation) [1983] 2 AC 192 (HL) at 208. 
190 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 204. 
191 In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 209F-H.  
192 In Re Roundwood Colliery Co. [1897] 1 Ch. 373 at 381. 
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with the general policy that, at the commencement of the winding-up, the debtor’s estate 
should not be subject to myriad separate claims, but should allow for the orderly and 
equitable collection and distribution of the remaining assets for the benefit of all creditors.  
However the exercise of the discretion in favour of maritime claimants in rem, after 
commencement of the winding-up, is entirely at odds with the position parochial creditors 
face. Thus, parochial creditors applying to the courts for leave to proceed with an attachment, 
execution or distress, after commencement, have all, bar a few exceptional cases, been 
refused. The following was remarked in an early case: 
On the other hand, the case of In re Lancashire Cotton Spinning Co. 35 Ch.D. 656 (CA) 
shews that a creditor who does not issue execution or a landlord who does not levy a 
distress until after the commencement of the winding up will not be allowed to proceed 
unless there are special reasons which render such a course inequitable.193 
 
The bar faced by parochial creditors to convince the courts to allow them to proceed 
is exceptionally high, especially when compared to maritime creditors in an action in rem. 
Some judgments go further than the ‘exceptional circumstances’ and posit that the creditor 
must advance ‘weighty reasons’ to justify his proceeding despite the commencement of 
winding-up.194  
One of the few cases in which the ‘special or exceptional circumstances, or weighty 
reasons’ test was satisfied was Armorduct Manufacturing Co Ltd v General Incandescent Co 
Ltd [1911] 2 K.B. 143 (Court of Appeal). Leave was granted to a creditor to execute upon a 
judgment after commencement but only because execution had been delayed by trickery on 
the part of the defendant. Indeed, a later case, though dealing with the discretion in s 
325(1)(c),195 said that trickery was the only circumstance which qualified as a special 
circumstance allowing the creditor to retain benefit of execution even though this was 
                                                 
193 In Re Roundwood Colliery Co. [1897] 1 Ch. 373 at 381. See also Re London and Devon Biscuit Co (1871) 
L.R. 12 Eq. 190, In re Exhall Coal Mining Co. (1864) 4 De G. J. & Sm. 377, In re Lancashire Cotton Spinning 
Co. 35 Ch.D. 656 (CA), Croshaw v Lyndhurst Ship Co [1897] 2 Ch. 154 at 162-163, Dimson's Estate Fire-Clay 
Co, Re (1874-75) L.R. 19 Eq. 202, Vron Colliery Co, Re (1882) 20 ChD 442 (CA) at 445, Anglo-Baltic and 
Mediterranean Bank v Barber & Co. [1924] 2 KB 410 at 418, Armorduct Manufacturing Co Ltd v General 
Incandescent Co Ltd [1911] 2 K.B. 143 (Court of Appeal), Buckingham International Plc (In Liquidation) 
(No.2), Re [1998] B.C.C. 943 (Court of Appeal). See also Gore-Browne on Companies 43 ed, vol 2 (1977) at 
35-4 and Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 7(4) (2004) para 888. 
194 Re Redman (Builders) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 541.  
195 Discretion in s 325 and 231 have been held to be the same, see In Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA) at 
209G-H. 
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uncompleted by the time winding-up commenced.196 As can be seen from the Zafiro, Linabol, 
and the Constellation cases, maritime creditors do not have to satisfy such a difficult test. 
Instead the discretion seems to be automatically exercised in their favour with little or no 
justification for such a departure from settled principles.  
There seems to be only a slight hint on the courts’ part justifying this ‘shipping bias’. 
Linabol allows the shipping claimant to continue without properly explaining what ‘special 
circumstances’ the claimant found himself in that would justify his continuing an action after 
the commencement of the winding-up – bar being a shipping creditor. Neither does the Zafiro 
or the Constellation. All allow maritime creditors to proceed despite winding-up having 
already begun. The only hint that perhaps reveals why the court allowed shipping creditors to 
proceed in circumstances where parochial creditors would not be permitted, is that all three 
cases refer to the special risks faced by maritime creditors.197  
    
                                                 
196 Re Grosvenor Metal Co Ltd [1950] Ch. 63. 
197 Linabol at 677, the Zafiro at 14-15, and the Constellation at 276. 
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CHAPTER 5: TRIUMPH OF ADMIRALTY OVER PAROCHIAL LAW? 
SECTION 10 OF AJRA 
 
Section 10 of AJRA,198 though having thus far received little attention in South Africa, is one 
of the outstanding features of South African admiralty practice since it so neatly avoids all 
the problems that English law faces when it comes to the interface between admiralty and 
insolvency law.199 Though it is one section, it would have been better to split it into two 
subsections to properly distinguish between its two separate but mutually reinforcing parts. 
The overall purpose of the section, and the emphasis in the first part is to, in line with 
the scheme of the AJRA,200 exclude property that is under the admiralty division’s 
jurisdiction from the control of the liquidator in a winding-up (as well as a trustee in a 
sequestration) – in essence, to ring-fence maritime property under the admiralty division’s 
control from the liquidator so that said maritime property (or more precisely, the fund formed 
from the sale of such property under s 9 of AJRA) can be used to satisfy solely maritime 
claims in the order of priorities as set out in s 11 of AJRA. This ensures that maritime 
property satisfies maritime claims first. Section 10 of AJRA is however subject to s 11(13) 
which states that if there is anything left in the maritime fund after all maritime claims have 
first been settled, then this balance is to paid over to the liquidator. This small caveat gives us 
an insight into the nature of s 10 - that by arresting (or getting security in admiralty), the 
admiralty division’s jurisdiction over the property is crystallised to the exclusion of all other 
courts with the aim of using the maritime fund to satisfy maritime claims first with any 
remainder being paid over to the liquidator. This, in essence, amounts to a statutory 
preference for maritime creditors over parochial creditors (as long as they act before the 
winding-up). 
Section 10 is triggered by three events: an arrest in admiralty, security given in 
respect of any maritime claim or a sale in admiralty. Only the first two need our attention 
since a sale in admiralty necessarily entails that there has first been an arrest or security. The 
fact that only an ‘arrest’ and not an attachment triggers s 10 may seem perplexing at first 
since it could mean that any maritime claimant that attaches in personam would not have the 
benefit of s 10 - with the potential that the property attached would fall into the insolvent 
                                                 
198 See Annexure A. 
199 See the discussion of some of the shortfalls of the English approach at pp 46-48 supra. 
200 See ss 3(5), 3(10), 9 and 11. 
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estate rather than remain under the admiralty division’s control. A less than satisfactory result 
as the maritime claimant would then have to compete with the claims of parochial creditors. 
However, s 8(2) of the AJRA clears up any potential confusion by saying that an attachment 
in personam for a maritime claim shall have the same result as an action in rem in respect of 
ss 9, 10 and 11. Therefore an attachment of maritime property201 also triggers the operation of 
s 10 (only an arrest shall be referred to in the rest of this section, but this should be taken to 
include attachments also unless the contrary is specified).  
Security in admiralty includes security to secure the release of any arrested property 
as well as security to avoid arrest.202 Once security is given, then it forms a fund under the 
admiralty division’s control which can be used to satisfy any maritime claims for which the 
security was given.203 Security to avoid arrest is the interesting feature for the purposes of this 
dissertation since security given to release property necessarily means that the ship is under 
arrest (thus already triggering s 10). Security to avoid arrest on the other hand would be its 
own triggering event as s 10 does not limit ‘security’ to security to release the ship from 
arrest but should be taken so as to also include security to avoid arrest. The threat of arrest to 
get pre-emptive security might be a way for a maritime claimant to get the protection of s 10 
quickly if the insolvency of the ship-owning company is imminent.204 
The second part of s 10 simply states that no claim in respect of any arrested property 
or any security, or the claim for which the arrest or security was given shall be stayed by, or 
by reason of, any sequestration or winding-up. A useful provision which, if it were part of 
English law, would avoid the flurry of applications and counter-applications from maritime 
claimants, parochial creditors, and liquidators, in two separate courts, when a ship-owning 
company is about to be wound-up.205 
Section 10 was considered in both the Rennie206 and Nantai Princess207 cases. In 
Rennie, counsel for the maritime creditor had tried to argue that, because of the special nature 
                                                 
201 Ie the six types of property which appear in s 3(5)(a) to (e) of AJRA. Property attached outside of this list of 
six does not form a fund in the same way as maritime property does (s 9), and the execution process for non-
maritime property that is attached is the same as the usual, civil method of execution (s11(1)(b)). 
202 See The Merak S 2002 (4) SA 273 (SCA) at 278E-279J for a discussion of security in admiralty claims. 
203 Sections 3(10) and 3(11) of the AJRA.  
204 See chapter 3.2 and note 92. 
205 As in the Linabol case, see discussion at pp 44-46. 
206 Rennie NO v South African Sea Products Ltd 1986 (2) SA 138 (C). 
207 The Nantai Princess Line Co Ltd v Cargo Laden on the Nantai Princess 1997 (2) SA 580 (D). 
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of the security given to maritime claimants, s 10 should be read so widely as to exclude 
property arrested (or security given) in admiralty even after the winding-up order had been 
made. On this point,208 Berman AJ reasoned that it is quite obvious, on a grammatical 
analysis of s 10, that it is definitely limited in time to arrests that occur before the winding-up 
order. This is because the section states that arrested property shall not form part of the assets 
to be administered by the liquidator. Had the section been intended to include arrests 
occurring after the order had been made this would have instead been read to say: to be 
administered or under administration by the liquidator’. In fact, it becomes even more 
obvious that s 10 is limited to arrests that occur before liquidation when one considers 
personal insolvency (‘sequestration’). For, in that regard, s 10 states that any arrested 
property shall not vest in the trustee in insolvency. The insolvent’s property vests in the 
trustee on his appointment.209 And of course, if property has already vested with the trustee it 
cannot also simultaneously vest in the admiralty division – property cannot vest in two 
persons.  
Levinsohn J in the Nantai Princess agreed with this analysis210 and it must be 
admitted, it would be hard to argue against it. Indeed, it is telling that counsel for the 
maritime claimants in the Nantai Princess, Mr Douglas Shaw QC (who authored one of the 
leading textbooks on admiralty in South Africa211 as well as drafted most of the AJRA) did 
not even attempt to argue against Berman AJ’s reasoning on this point even though it would 
have been, if successful, determinative of the case in his client’s favour. 
After surveying the English and South African approaches to the interface between 
admiralty and insolvency law, it is not too hard to see the advantages of the jurisdiction 
approach as evinced by s 10 of the AJRA. The English secured creditor approach is confused, 
inconsistent, time-consuming and expensive. South Africa’s jurisdiction approach is none of 
these things. It is a much simpler and cleaner approach to the whole problem. It avoids a 
multiplicity of proceedings in two different courts. By clearly setting out which court has 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it avoids courts being set up against one another. It is 
fairer to maritime claimants who have been given special rights by statute to secure and 
                                                 
208 Rennie at 144I-145C. 
209 Section 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
210 Nantai Princess at 590I-591B. Though the learned judge also wondered whether, given the special nature of 
the protection given to maritime claimants, s 10 should be amended to exclude property arrested in admiralty at 
any time from falling into the insolvent estate. 
211 DJ Shaw Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa (1987).  
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enforce their claims. Finally, the jurisdiction approach ensures that maritime property 
remains under the admiralty division’s control to satisfy maritime debts and where ships can 
be sold quickly, under a well-known process, for the best price and free from any 
encumbrances, charges and liens. By so doing, it avoids the unfair situation where a ship is 
already under arrest in the admiralty division when its company gets wound-up which 
thereby prevents subsequent maritime creditors from enforcing their claims. 
In fairness to the English approach, though it is confusing and time-consuming, it has 
ironically turned out to be much friendlier to maritime creditors than South Africa. This is 
because of the discretion in s 231 of the Companies Act, 1948, which is not part of South 
African law, and which gives English courts the liberty to allow shipping creditors to proceed 
with their claim despite the commencement of the winding-up. As we have seen from the 
South African cases of Rennie and the Nantai Princess, once winding-up commences (and 
provided of course the order is made final) a maritime creditor seeking to enforce her claim in 
South Africa cannot proceed in admiralty and would be forced to share in the insolvent estate 
with parochial creditors instead of with just maritime creditors. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE NATURE OF THE ACTION IN REM AND UNITY 
OF OWNERSHIP FOR STATUTORY LIENS IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
I. The nature of the action in rem 
 
An interesting argument to counter any contention by the liquidator that any proceeding 
against the company after commencement of the winding-up is void, first raised by counsel in 
In Re Australian Direct Steam Navigation Company,212 is that by its very nature, an action in 
rem is an action against the ship itself and not the owner. This was also a point raised by 
counsel for the maritime claimant in In Re Aro213 though not argued before the court. The 
argument proceeds along the following lines: as the action in rem is an action against the ship 
itself, the arrest does not fall foul of the provisions in the Companies Act that void certain 
actions against the company after commencement of winding-up. This is an argument which, 
if true, could have implications for the debate over the nature of the action in rem.214 
Unfortunately for the argument, the action in rem, at least in England,215 has for some time 
been held to be an action designed to compel the owner who is personally liable to appear 
before the court – the procedural theory.216 Therefore, from its outset,217 the action in rem is 
against the owner of the ship. There is thus no room to argue, if one accepts the long-standing 
procedural view of the action in rem, that an arrest is directly against the ship and thus does 
not fall foul of those provisions in the Companies Act which void proceedings against the 
company after commencement of the winding-up. 
There is however a more substantial reason not to accept this argument and that is that 
s 228 of the Companies Act, 1948, like all its predecessors and successors, voids an arrest 
                                                 
212 (1875) LR 20 Eq 325. 
213 [1979] Ch 613. 
214 For an overview of the debate see Derrington and Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters (2007) 
at 18-30 and Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 98-116. 
215 And probably also in South Africa since the decision in the MV Alina II (No 2) Transnet Ltd v Owner of MV 
Alina II 2011 (6) SA 206 (SCA). 
216 See the Dictator [1892] P 304, the Indian Grace (No 2) [1997] UKHL 40; [1998] AC 878. 
217 The Indian Grace suggests that the action in rem is from the outset against the owner of the ship. This is 
subject to trenchant criticism by N Teare QC ‘The Admiralty action in rem and the House of Lords’ [1998] 
LMCLQ 33 however, who argues that it is only entry of appearance which turns the action into a hybrid. 
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effected after the commencement of the winding-up as a ‘sequestration’ put in force against 
the company or its effects. The section is clearly not designed to void certain proceedings 
only against the company, but also against the company’s assets (or ‘effects’ as the section 
describes it). The arrest would thus be void. Section 231 is of no use in this scenario either as 
the dispensing power in that section to nevertheless allow void proceedings in terms of s 228 
to proceed, is limited to proceedings against the company, and not proceedings against the 
company and its effects.218  
II. Unity of ownership for statutory liens 
 
Another argument, though this time raised on behalf of liquidators seeking to have arrests in 
rem disallowed after commencement of the winding-up, is to be found in Linabol. Before 
discussing the argument itself, it would be useful to first remember the important distinction 
between an action in rem based on maritime lien, to one based on statutory lien, which was 
discussed supra.219 An action in rem based on a statutory lien, both in England220 and South 
Africa,221 requires that the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable on the cause 
of action in personam – in essence, there must be a same link in the ownership of the ship by 
the owner who is personally liable, both at the time the cause of action arose, and when it is 
enforced.222  
The argument followed an old and well established rule of English insolvency law 
that is to the effect that, at the commencement of the winding-up, the assets of the company 
pass into a statutory scheme of arrangement.223 Therefore an arrest in rem based on a 
statutory lien after commencement is actually not possible because there is not the necessary 
                                                 
218 Section 130 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 (the successor to s 231) however does include the company as well 
as its assets as part of the discretion. 
219 See chapter 2.1. 
220 Section 21(4)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 says an action in rem may be enforced against the ship 
concerned if the beneficial owner was the same when the cause of action arose to when the action is enforced. 
221 Section 3(4)(b) of the AJRA is to the same effect as the SCA, 1981 except it speaks of the ‘owner’ and not 
the ‘beneficial owner’. 
222 The only exception to this rule, which need not detain us, is the associated and sister ship provisions in South 
Africa and England respectively. 
223 Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167 at 176-177, Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd 
[1983] 2 AC 192 and In Re Oriental Inland Steam Co (1874) 9 Ch. App. 557. 
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unity of ownership224 (as the ship would have passed from the personally liable owner to the 
trustee in the time between the cause of action to the time the claim is enforced). In effect, 
that the link in ownership necessary for the action in rem based on statutory lien is missing 
right from the very beginning of the action. 
If accepted, this would be a formidable obstacle for maritime claimants seeking to 
enforce their claim in rem. Fortunately, this argument has never been the basis for a court’s 
decision not to allow an action in rem to proceed. As discussed supra225 in the one case where 
the argument was seriously raised, it was turned on its head by the court and therefore not 
critically considered. It however raises issues of fundamental importance to maritime 
creditors since, the Supreme Court Act, 1981226 requires beneficial ownership of the ship to 
be the same both when the cause of action arose and when it is enforced. As seen from the 
Ayerst227 case, it is exactly this beneficial ownership which passes from the shipowner into 
the statutory scheme once winding-up commences and which could in the future, be a 
problem for maritime claimants. 
This issue is also discussed by the learned authors of The Law and Practice of 
Admiralty Matters228 where they cite cases involving just this point in Australia and Hong 
Kong and where the courts in each of these countries refused to follow the Ayerst principle. 
These cases instead reasoned that ownership of the company’s assets must be distinguished 
from control – the statutory scheme only gives the liquidator control of the company’s assets 
and not ownership. The maritime claimants could therefore still commence their actions in 
rem based on a statutory lien even after commencement of the winding-up. Interestingly this 
same distinction has long been recognised in the law of corporate winding-up in South 
Africa, see s 361 of the Companies Act, 1973 (cf though individual insolvency in South 
Africa, sequestration, where under s 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, 1936, the assets of the 
insolvent do vest in the trustee when the sequestration order is made (which includes a 
provisional order see s 2 sv ‘sequestration order’). 
This is yet another reason for English law to heed South Africa’s jurisdiction 
approach since issues of vesting and beneficial ownership would not matter if the South 
African approach were followed.  
                                                 
224 Linabol [1995] BCC 666 at 675. 
225 See discussion on Linabol supra pp 44-46.  
226 Section 21(4)(b). 
227 Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167. 
228 Derrington and Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters (2007) at 203-204 and 206-209. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
At the beginning of this dissertation we considered the timing of two crucial events: the 
accrual of the security in admiralty claims (based on maritime liens, in rem claims, and in 
personam claims) as well as the commencement of winding-up proceedings. Both are 
problematic. The former because the answer would seem to be that, at least for the 
contentious statutory lien, the security accrues once the writ is issued. This has however, been 
shown to be problematic and not consistent with South African common law. The latter is 
problematic mainly because of the retrospective effect of the winding-up order – that it is 
deemed to commence, and hence that a number of provisions come into play which hinder 
enforcement of claims against the debtor, when the application for winding-up is presented to 
court and not when an order for winding-up is made.  
South African case law has not been as generous to maritime creditors as s 10 of 
AJRA would seem to suggest. Instead it has been quite strict to enforce the retrospective 
effects of the winding-up process to maritime creditors. English law on the other hand has, 
despite a number of contradictory and at times confusing approaches, ultimately dealt with 
maritime creditors in a much more free-handed manner.  
This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate the awkward overlap between two 
areas of law that have developed with little regard to one another. Arguably the approach of 
South African law, which is to look first and foremost at which court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, is far superior conceptually, as well as in its practical results, than English 
law. The English approach attempts to fit admiralty processes into the nomenclature and legal 
framework of insolvency law with varying results. Ultimately, in order to fit the admiralty 
action in rem English courts have had to unjustifiably enlarge a statutory discretion. It is also 
costly, time-consuming and unfair to litigants. The South African approach is none of these 
things and though not as accommodating to maritime creditors as English law, it is at least 
very clear and recognises the problem for what it truly is: one of jurisdiction. English law 
would do well to borrow from the South African example to clear up this confusing area of 
its law. 
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- Constitutional Reform Act, 2005. 
- Insolvency Act, 1986. 
- Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 167). 
- Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC). 
- Senior Courts Act, 1981.  
- Supreme Court Act, 1981 (see the Senior Courts Act, 1981). 
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c. 66). 
 
South Africa: 
- Admiralty Jurisdiction and Regulation Act 105 of 1983. 
- Admiralty Rules of South Africa, 1997. 
- Cape Tacit Hypothec Amendment Act 5 of 1861. 
- Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
- Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
- Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
- Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
- Natal Act 13 of 1887. 
- Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act 36 of 1976. 
- Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. 
- Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.   
- Transvaal Administration of Estates Proclamation 28 of 1902. 
 
International: 
- The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1926 (the ‘Maritime Liens Convention’). 
- The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the 
Arrest of Sea-going Ships, 1952 (the ‘Arrest Convention’). 
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Annexure A – Table of statutory provisions  
Type of Provision United Kingdom South Africa 
Void Actions - s 163 of the Companies Act, 
1862 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 14.): 
‘Where any company is being 
wound up by the Court or subject 
to the supervision of the Court, 
any attachment, sequestration, 
distress, or execution put in force 
against the estate or effects of the 
company after the 
commencement of the winding-
up shall be void to all intents.’ 
- s 228 of the Companies Act, 
1948: ‘Where any company 
registered in England is being 
wound up by the court, any 
attachment, sequestration, 
distress or execution put in force 
against the estate or effects of the 
company after the 
commencement of the winding 
up shall be void to all intents.’ 
- s 128 of the Insolvency Act, 
1986: ‘Where a company 
registered in England and Wales 
is being wound up by the court, 
any attachment, sequestration, 
distress or execution put in force 
against the estate or effects of the 
company after the 
commencement of the winding 
up is void.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- s 359(1)(b) of the 
Companies Act 61 of 
1973: ‘Any attachment or 
execution put in force 
against the estate or assets 
of the company after the 
commencement of the 
winding-up shall be void.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proceedings after 
winding-up order 
(notice South Africa 
has no discretion). 
- s 87 of the Companies Act, 1862 
(56 & 57 Vict. c. 14.): ‘When an 
order has been made for winding 
up a company under this Act, no 
suit, action, or other proceeding 
shall be proceeded with or 
commenced against the 
company, except with the leave 
of the Court, and subject to such 
terms as the Court may impose.’ 
- s 231 of the Companies Act, 
1948: ‘When a winding-up order 
has been made or a provisional 
liquidator has been appointed, no 
action or proceeding shall be 
proceeded with or commenced 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- s 359(1) of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973: ‘When the 
Court has made an order 
for the winding-up of a 
company or a special 
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against the company except by 
leave of the court and subject to 
such terms as the court may 
impose.’ 
- s 130 of the Insolvency Act, 
1986: ‘When a winding-up order 
has been made or a provisional 
liquidator has been appointed, no 
action or proceeding shall be 
proceeded with or commenced 
against the company or its 
property, except by leave of the 
court and subject to such terms 
as the court may impose.’ 
 
resolution for the voluntary 
winding-up of a company 
has been registered in 
terms of section 200 –  
(a) all civil proceedings by 
or against the company 
concerned shall be 
suspended until the 
appointment of a 
liquidator.’ 
Maintaining benefit 
of attachment or 
execution 
- s 325(1) of the Companies Act, 
1948: ‘Where a creditor has 
issued execution against the 
goods or lands of a company or 
has attached any debt due to the 
company, and the company is 
subsequently wound-up, he shall 
not be entitled to retain the 
benefit of the execution or 
attachment against the liquidator 
in the winding up of the 
company unless he has 
completed the execution or 
attachment before the 
commencement of the winding 
up; 
(c) the rights conferred by this 
subsection on the liquidator may 
be set aside by the court in 
favour of the creditor to such 
extent and subject to such terms 
as the court may think fit.’ 
- s 183(1) of the Insolvency Act, 
1986: ‘Where a creditor has 
issued execution against the 
goods or land of a company or 
has attached any debt due to it, 
and the company is subsequently 
wound up, he is not entitled to 
retain the benefit of the 
execution or attachment against 
the liquidator unless he has 
completed the execution or 
attachment before the 
commencement of the winding 
- No Equivalent in South 
Africa 
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up. 
(c) the rights conferred by 
subsection (1) on the liquidator 
may be set aside by the court in 
favour of the creditor to such 
extent and subject to such terms 
as the court thinks fit.’ 
 
Discretionary stay 
after application for 
winding-up presented 
but before order 
- s 226 of the Companies Act, 
1948: ‘At any time after the 
presentation of a winding-up 
petition, and before a winding-up 
order has been made, the 
company, or any creditor or 
contributory, may— 
 (a) where any action or 
proceeding against the company 
is pending in the High Court or 
Court of Appeal in against 
England or Northern Ireland, 
apply to the court in company in 
which the action or proceeding is 
pending for a stay of proceedings 
therein; and 
(b) where any other action or 
proceeding is pending against the 
company, apply to the court 
having jurisdiction to wind-up 
the company to restrain further 
proceedings in the action or 
proceeding; and the court to 
which application is so made 
may, as the case may be, stay or 
restrain the proceedings 
accordingly on such terms as it 
thinks fit.’ 
 
 
 
- s 358 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973: ‘At any 
time after the presentation 
of an application for 
winding-up and before a 
winding-up order has been 
made, the company 
concerned or any creditor 
or member thereof may-  
(a) where any action or 
proceeding by or against 
the company is pending in 
any court in the Republic, 
apply to such court for a 
stay of the proceedings; 
and 
(b) where any other action 
or proceeding is being or 
about to be instituted 
against the company, apply 
to the Court to which the 
application for winding-up 
has been presented, for an 
order restraining further 
proceedings in the action 
or proceeding, and the 
court may stay or restrain 
the proceedings 
accordingly on such terms 
as it thinks fit.’ 
Commencement of 
winding-up 
- s 84 of the Companies Act, 
1862: ‘A winding up of a 
company by the Court shall be 
deemed to commence at the time 
of the presentation of the petition 
for the winding-up.’ 
- s 229 of the Companies Act, 
1948: 
 
 
 
- s 348 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973: ‘A 
winding-up of a company 
by the Court shall be 
deemed to commence at 
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‘(1) Where, before the 
presentation of a petition for the 
winding-up of a company by the 
court, a resolution has been 
passed by the company for 
voluntary winding up, the 
winding-up of the company shall 
be deemed to have commenced 
at the time of the passing of the 
resolution, and unless the court, 
on proof of fraud or mistake, 
thinks fit otherwise to direct, all 
proceedings taken in the 
voluntary winding up shall be 
deemed to have been validly 
taken. 
(2) In any other case, the 
winding up of a company by the 
court shall be deemed to 
commence at the time of the 
presentation of the petition for 
the winding up.’ 
the time of the presentation 
to the Court of the 
application for the 
winding-up.’ 
Section 10 of the 
AJRA 
- No equivalent in Supreme Court 
Act, 1981 
- Any property arrested in 
respect of a maritime claim 
or any security given in 
respect of any property, or 
the proceeds of any 
property sold in execution 
or under an order of a court 
in the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction, 
shall not, except as 
provided in section 11 
(13), vest in a trustee in 
insolvency and shall not 
form part of the assets to 
be administered by a 
liquidator or judicial 
manager of the owner of 
the property or of any 
other person who might 
otherwise be entitled to 
such property, security or 
proceeds, and no 
proceedings in respect of 
such property, security or 
proceeds, or the claim in 
respect of which that 
property was arrested, shall 
be stayed by or by reason 
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of any sequestration, 
winding-up or judicial 
management with respect 
to that owner or person. 
Section 11(13) of the 
AJRA 
- No equivalent in Supreme Court 
Act, 1981 
- Any balance remaining 
after the claims mentioned 
in paragraphs (a) to (e) of 
subsection (4) and the 
claims mentioned in 
subsection (11) have been 
paid, shall be paid over to 
any trustee, liquidator or 
judicial manager who, but 
for the provisions of 
section 10, would have 
been entitled thereto or 
otherwise to any other 
person entitled thereto. 
